

A Survey of Japan's Contribution to Peacebuilding: Timor-Leste as a Case 日本の平和構築への貢献についての調査：東ティモールを事例として

国際平和協力本部事務局主査（企画担当）

塚本剛志

要 旨

東ティモールは、1999年の直接投票を経て2002年に独立を達成したが、それに伴い紛争を経験し、2006年にも騒擾事件が発生し、国内の平和と安全は未だ達成されていない。国連、日本を含む国際社会は、国際平和協力や開発援助を通じた支援を継続し、東ティモールは平和構築へのプロセスを進んできている。日本は、国際平和協力及び開発援助の双方を通じ、過去10年間にわたり東ティモールの平和構築に貢献してきた。同国は、日本が外交政策において重視するアジアに位置する。また同国において発生した紛争は、国際平和協力法における参加5原則を満たすと解釈されてきた。それゆえ、日本が東ティモールの平和構築に関与してきた期間及び頻度は、他の国、及び地域の平和構築への取り組みとの比較において顕著である。他方、同国に展開する国連PKOに対する要員派遣については、日本よりも大規模な要員の派遣をするなど、より強いコミットメントを示す国があり、さらに開発援助においては、援助額の点で日本は他ドナーの後塵を拝している。

Introduction

1. Research purpose

The purpose of this paper is to survey the experiences and achievements of Japan's contribution to peacebuilding, in particular in Timor-Leste. So far, Japan has implemented 7 international peace cooperation assignments of dispatching of personnel and 2 assignments of contributions in kind to the country¹, according to the International Peace Cooperation Law (Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations)². Besides, Japan has been ranked as the top 5 donors in bilateral development assistance to Timor-Leste. It is true that there is no other conflict-affected countries or areas, except for Timor-Leste, that have repeatedly received a number of Japanese combined supports for a long time. Therefore, in Japan's diplomacy, the effort made toward Timor-Leste seems to be a

¹ Web page of the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office explains the details of those assignments, http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/e_timor/e_timor01.html.

² English version of this law is available at http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/data/law/pdf/law_e.pdf

unique example. This paper, based on the discussion of Japan's experience in Timor-Leste, tries to find some factors that may condition Japan's peacebuilding implementation. This paper mainly discusses two types of Japan's diplomatic tools, peace cooperation and development assistance, as instruments for peacebuilding. Other instruments such as preventive diplomacy, peace making, and peace enforcement can be left outside of the scope of this paper.

2. The last decade of Timor-Leste: independence, conflict and reconstruction

A brief history of Timor-Leste provides a starting point. Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, called Timor-Leste (Leste means east in Portuguese) lies in Southeast Asia, northwest of Australia and at the eastern end of the Indonesian archipelago. The estimated population as of 2008 is 1,100,000³. Timor-Leste is known as one of the world's newest nations. Historically, it had been a Portuguese colony, and in 1976 it was annexed by Indonesia as the 27th state of it. The international status of Timor-Leste had been in dispute since the mid-1970s. The referendum, called "popular consultation" carried out in 1999 revealed the aspiration of about 80% of the people for independence from Indonesia. In that one chance in a million, the people of Timor-Leste voted against an expanded autonomy proposal presented by the Indonesian government. However, a subliminal social confrontation simultaneously appeared when Timor-Leste tried to turn to be independent because their society was not ready to face a radical progress at that time⁴. The growing tendency to be independent caused an extreme domestic confusion that could be eventually suppressed only by the military intervention of an Australian-led United Nations military force. The violent situation broke out right after the referendum and it was estimated that over 1,000 people died because of it. An estimated 75% of the population was displaced, and nearly 70% of all buildings were destroyed by an

³ World bank data ,
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/ViewSharedReport?&CF=&REPORT_ID=9147&REQUEST_TYPE=VIEWADVANCED

⁴ Takai. F., (2005), The Promotion of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Process through Development Aid Programmes in Timor-Leste, Institute for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency, p.22, "Reconciliation is an ambiguous word. When people are reconciled, it happens based on their own thoughts. It is very much a personal process. Thus, there are many ways and many standards to be reconciled at a personal level. In some cases there may not even be a need for reconciliation. Furthermore, reconciliation is often restricted by political matters (Takeuchi(2002), 'National reconciliation-over suppression, civil war and massacre', Ajiken World Trend no.82, July 2002, p.2-3.). Under the name of national reconciliation, it could simply be used as a political tool".

orchestrated campaign conducted by militia groups. About 70% of the economic infrastructure of the country was laid waste.

From then onwards, a peacebuilding process started in Timor-Leste. Under the presence of UN peacekeeping mission, the representatives of the Constituent Assembly were elected in 2001. The Constitution of Timor-Leste was finalized and the Presidential election was conducted in 2002. In the same year, Timor-Leste, which had endured severe circumstances, finally gained independence. It became one of the world's newest nations, following 24 years of Indonesian control and three years of United Nations administration.

Although a progress toward nation building had seemed to be smooth, in April 2006, Timor-Leste experienced another social disorder. Due to deterioration in national security, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established in August of the same year. With the commitment of the international community, mainly supported by UNMIT⁵, the Presidential and the Parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste were concluded in 2007. In a generally calm security environment, the results of those voting were widely accepted by all political actors and the people, demonstrating that there had been considerable progress in dialogue and reconciliation⁶.

The report⁷ of the Secretary-General dated on 12 February 2010 described that Political developments in Timor-Leste were generally indicative of continuing

⁵ UN Security Council resolution 1704 on 25 August of 2006 stipulated that the Council further encouraged Timor-Leste to enact a set of electoral legislation which provided for the 2007 elections to be supervised, organized, administered and conducted in a free, fair and transparent manner, with due respect to the need to establish an independent mechanism, and reflects general consensus within Timor-Leste regarding the appropriate modalities for the 2007 electoral process. Also the resolution urged the development partners including the United Nations agencies and multilateral financial institutions to continue providing resources and assistance for the preparations for the 2007 elections and other projects towards sustainable and long-term development in Timor-Leste.

⁶ Takai, F., (2005), The Promotion of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding Process through Development Aid Programmes in Timor-Leste, Institute for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency, p.45 "People obtain the small sense of community based on their kinship. There are often no community leaders who could unite the whole community beyond the kinship. In addition, even in the same community, each family and each person has different experiences of Indonesian occupation and the violence following the referendum in 1999."

⁷ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 24 September 2009 to 20 January 2010) describes that the elections for local authorities, which were not based on political party affiliation, were held on 9 October, with voters casting ballots for chiefs and councils of the country's 442 villages (sucos). The election campaign from 30 September to 6

stability and Political parties demonstrated continued respect for democratic processes even when addressing contentious issues. In addition, the report mentioned that the security situation in the country remained stable. On the other hand, the country at that time was in the process of establishing itself as an independent state⁸. It faced many fundamental challenges generally common to post-conflict countries, such as a high poverty rate, social and political fragility, weak public and private sector capacity, poor social and economic infrastructure, new and less experienced institutions, and limited economic opportunities. In April 2009, the Government of Timor-Leste appealed to the international community with a watchword such as “Goodbye conflict, Welcome development”, indicating that the country had already passed a reconstruction phase, making its way to a development phase. Further, the Government identified four major priorities which were formulated in the national development plan from 2009-2013. Those were infrastructure, production-related areas, provision of social services and governance⁹.

I. International Peace Cooperation to Timor-Leste

1. The United Nations peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste

The United Nations peacekeeping mission is a unique instrument developed as a way to help countries and areas suffered from conflicts to restore peace and stability. Over the years, peacekeeping activities have evolved into meeting the demands of different types of conflicts and mitigating political tension¹⁰. UN operation

October and the voting were conducted in a generally peaceful atmosphere. Participation was high, with 67.75% of registered voters casting ballots. The results saw only marginal gains in women’s representation at the village (suco) level despite the advocacy efforts of President José Ramos-Horta and the SG’s Special Representative, with the number of women elected as village chiefs increasing slightly from 7 to 11. Timor-Leste has taken positive steps towards the establishment of democratic institutions and carried out peaceful elections in 2007, leading to a new Government with a majority in Parliament and an active opposition, as well as village (suco) elections in 2009.

⁸ The report above quoted describes that while Timor-Leste has made considerable progress in many areas since 1999 and 2006, fundamental political, institutional and socio-economic issues remain. Timor-Leste has recovered from the 2006 crisis insofar as the immediate challenges have been resolved, with stability and security restored, and a largely peaceful transition to a new Government.

⁹ UNDP(2008), UNDP Country Programme for Timor-Leste(2009-2013), p.5

¹⁰ The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, there have been a total of 63 UN peacekeeping operations around the world. The term "peacekeeping" is not found in the United Nations Charter and defies simple definition.

in Timor-Leste at present is the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which was established in 2006. UNMIT was preceded by several other UN peacekeeping operations and political missions in the same country since 1999¹¹.

To begin with, the UN Mission in East Timor, UNAMET was deployed from June to October in 1999. The principal mandate of UNAMET was to organize and conduct a popular consultation to ascertain if the people of Timor-Leste accepted a special autonomy proposed by Indonesian or rejected it. Secondly, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established in October 1999 as a peacekeeping mission, and ended in May 2002. Since the violent situation expanded throughout the country following the rejection of special autonomy by Indonesia, the UN Security Council urgently established UNTAET in order to stabilize the public security and order. UNTAET exercised as an administrative authority over Timor-Leste during the transition period, which led to full-fledged independence in 2002.

Next, taking over the authority of UNTAET, the Security Council decided to establish a following mission, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET). This mission was mandated to deploy from May 2002 to May 2005, which was also a peacekeeping mission. UNMISSET provided assistances for the newly independent nation until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the Timor-Leste authorities.

Furthermore, once a couple of peacekeeping missions withdrew, a political mission, the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) deployed from May 2005 to August 2006. UNOTIL took over the important role of the previous missions, supporting the development and improvement of State level institutions of the country, including its police sector. This mission provided training in the observance of democratic governance and human rights. At the initial period of UNOTIL, it was scheduled to complete its presence in May 2006 and the Security Council had already a specific post-UNOTIL policy. However, Timor-Leste was confronted with a critical situation in April-June in 2006. Here, the leaders of the country and the international community were forced to recognize a glimpse of the background of the country. On 11 June in

Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, referred to it as belonging to "Chapter Six and a Half" of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII (<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>).

¹¹ UN Security Council resolution 1704 on 25 August of 2006 decides to establish a follow-on mission in Timor-Leste, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

2006, the President of Timor-Leste, the President of the National Parliament and the Prime Minister wrote to UN Secretary-General to request a continuous contribution by the international body for the purpose of maintaining the stability of the country. Based on this request, the Security Council decided to prolong UNOTIL activities up to 20 August 2006.

2. UN mission in Timor-Leste at present: UNMIT

Considering the recommendations submitted by the Secretary-General, the Security Council chaired by Japan, adopted its resolution 1704 on 25 August 2006, to establish a new mission, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). UNMIT launched in the wake of a political, humanitarian and security crisis affected by the crisis in April-May 2006¹². UNMIT was expected to get down to several fundamental factors such as democratic governance, election, security, judicial system, and humanitarian assistance. Resolution 1704 mandated that UNMIT consisted primarily of a civilian component, including police personnel, military liaison and staff officers¹³, so that the country strengthened its own capacity in various sectors. Having replaced UNOTIL, UNMIT up to now has been working with the cooperation of the Government of Timor-Leste, national political parties and other stakeholders in the country and in the region, focusing on ensuring the effective implementation of its mandate. By its resolution 1704, the Security Council mandated UNMIT as follows;

- (a) Support the Government and relevant institutions with a view to consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance and facilitating political dialogue;
- (b) Support Timor-Leste in all aspects of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary electoral process;
- (c) Provide support to the national police and assist in conducting a comprehensive review of the role and needs of the security sector;

¹² UNMIT was established with a far-reaching mandate to assist the country in overcoming the consequences and the underlying causes of the 2006 crisis (<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmit/background.shtml>).

¹³ UN Security Council resolution 1704 on 25 August 2006 decided to establish a follow-on mission in Timor-Leste, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), for an initial period of six months, with the intention to renew for further periods, and further decided that UNMIT would consist of an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,608 police personnel, and an initial component of up to 34 military liaison and staff officers.

- (d) Assist in further strengthening the national capacity for the monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights;
- (e) Cooperate and coordinate with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and all relevant partners with a view to making maximum use of assistance in post conflict peacebuilding and capacity-building.

Subsequently to its resolution 1704, the Security Council modified the mandates for UNMIT by several following resolutions. For example, by its resolution 1802 on 25 February 2008, which was adopted after the attacks on the President and the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste on 11 February 2008, the Security Council also requested UNMIT to:

- (a) Continue its efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the judiciary system;
- (b) Support the Government of Timor-Leste in its efforts to coordinate donor cooperation in areas of institutional capacity-building;
- (c) Intensify its efforts, working with partners, to assist with further training, mentoring, institutional development and strengthening of the PNTL.

By its resolution 1867 on 26 February 2009, the Security Council entrusted UNMIT a number of additional tasks, including the support for local elections in 2009, in response to the request from the Government of Timor-Leste. Moreover, by its resolution of 1912 on 26 February 2010, the Security Council again requested UNMIT to extend the necessary support for municipal elections and also encouraged the international community to assist in the democratic process at the local level of the country. Since the establishment of the mission, the security in Timor-Leste has remained relatively calm, and UNMIT's effective efforts to promote a political dialogue and national reconciliation and to implement each provision of its mandate have maintained. A comprehensive effort combined by the UN Missions and bilateral assistances has been actively and effectively instrumental in providing coordinated policy, political, technical and financial support to help Timor-Leste accomplish its goals. By its resolution 1912, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of UNMIT until 26 February 2011, sustaining the current authorized level¹⁴ (see, Box1).

Therefore, in the course of these developments, the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the UN

¹⁴ UN Security Council resolution 1912 stipulates that the Council decided to extend the mandate of UNMIT until 26 February 2011 at the current authorized levels.

Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), and the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) have significantly played the key role.

3. Japan's International Peace Cooperation Assignments in Timor-Leste

Aiming to play a more active role in the international peace cooperation arena, Japan enacted the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, which is called “the International Peace Cooperation Law” in June 1992. Since then, the law has permitted Japan to provide military and civil personnel and material support for initiatives conducted by the UN and other international organizations. The law establishes the three pillars of Japan's international peace cooperation as follows; participation in UN peacekeeping operations, contribution to international humanitarian relief operations, and contribution to international election monitoring activities¹⁵.

(a) UN Peacekeeping Operations

UN peacekeeping operations are activities undertaken by the UN to resolve conflicts around the world. In traditional peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping forces composed of national contingents of troops and cease-fire observer missions (in principle composed of unarmed military personnel) perform such tasks as monitoring cease-fires, separating hostile forces, and maintaining buffer zones. More recently, peacekeeping operations have expanded to include such administrative assistance activities as election and human rights monitoring, reconstruction and development, and organization and institution building, carried out by civilian personnel.

(b) International Humanitarian Relief Operations

International humanitarian relief operations, undertaken outside the parameters of UN peacekeeping operations, provide assistance to refugees and other people affected by conflicts (afflicted persons) and the repair of damage caused by conflicts. These operations are usually carried out by international organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

¹⁵ Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office(2009), Paths to Peace, History of Japan's International Peace Cooperation, 2009 edition, p.1-3.

(c) International Election Observation Activities

International election observation activities aim to ensure the fair execution of elections and other voting to establish a ruling apparatus by democratic means in areas disrupted by conflict. These operations are implemented outside the parameters of UN peacekeeping operations and are carried out principally by the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other regional organizations.

Timor-Leste sits in the geopolitically important area that divides Asia and the Pacific. Recognizing that stabilizing this area definitely contributes to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan has placed an emphasis on this issue. From this viewpoint, the Japanese government has been actively providing a wide ranging type of assistance to the new born country for its reconstruction and development¹⁶. The details of the past assignments of dispatch of personnel are as follows¹⁷;

(1) Civilian Police Officers (July to September 1999)

Responding to the request from UN, Japan dispatched three civilian police officers to UNAMET, which conducted the direct ballot on August 30, 1999. From July to September 1999, two civilian police officers were stationed at the UNAMET headquarters in Dili, and one was stationed at the UNAMET office in Jakarta, Indonesia. Their duties were to collect information on incidents in Timor-Leste and advised the Indonesian police who were responsible for maintaining law and order there.

(2) Displaced Persons Relief Unit (November 1999 to February 2000)

Upon the request of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), air transport units of the Self-Defense Forces were dispatched and

¹⁶ In addition to a series of dispatch of personnel, Japan has made contributions in kind to Timor-Leste. As the first assignment in 1999, Japan provided 2,000 radios to UNAMET for pre-election publicity purposes. As the second assignment of the same year, Japan provided relief supplies, including tents, blankets, sleeping mats, water containers, and plastic sheeting to the UNHCR. At that period, UNHCR implemented humanitarian activities in Timor-Leste and Indonesia in behalf of displaced persons.

¹⁷ The information is derived mainly from the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office(2009), Paths to Peace, History of Japan's International Peace Cooperation, 2009 Edition.

transported humanitarian relief goods to Timor-Leste for a large number of refugees and IDPs resulting from the confrontation after the popular consultation. The air units and other personnel to Indonesia from November 1999 to February 2000 provided transport services as part of UNHCR operations.

(3) Election Observers (August to September 2001)

On August 30, 2001, the election for the Constituent Assembly was held supported by UNTAET. On the request from UN, Japan dispatched 14 election observers composed of 8 national government officials and 6 individuals from the private sector. The duties of those were to collect information from relevant organizations and to monitor election campaign and related activities. On the voting day, they observed 15 polling stations.

(4) Staff Officers (February 2002 to June 2004)

Japan sent a group of 10 staff officers to the headquarters of UNTAET and UNMISSET from February 2002 to May 2003. The second party of 7 staff officers also was sent from April 2003 to June 2004. The dispatched personnel were stationed in the headquarters in Dili, being involved in planning and coordination for the maintenance and repair of infrastructures and other logistic supports.

(5) Engineer Units (March 2002 to June 2004)

Japan dispatched 680 Ground Self-Defense Forces personnel in the Engineer Units and 10 staff officers to UNTAET. They carried out logistic operations for UNTAET as the maintenance and repair of infrastructures. Those operations were expected to provide assistance for the economic activities and daily lives of the country. UN officials and Timor-Leste's leaders voiced appreciation for the activities of the Japanese unit at various opportunities.

(6) Election Observers (April 2002)

On April 14, 2002, the presidential election was held in Timor-Leste under the auspices of UNTAET. Upon the request of UN, Japan dispatched eight election observers, made up of 4 national government officials and 4 individuals from the private sector. They watched over the campaigning and

election preparations. On the election day, they monitored voting at a total of 14 polling stations, and the next day monitored ballot counting.

(7) Civilian Police Officers (January 2007 to February 2008)

In April 2006, the security situation in Timor-Leste deteriorated in the wake of protest activities. At the request of UN, Japan dispatched a total of 4 civilian police officers to UNMIT on separated occasions between January 2007 and February 2008. The first pair was stationed from January to August 2007 and the second pair from August 2007 to February 2008. The Japanese personnel were assigned to the civilian police component of the headquarters of UNMIT, where they conducted such activities as giving advice to the police component.

(8) Election Observers (March to July 2007)

In Timor-Leste in 2007, three important elections were realized, the presidential election on April 9, the presidential runoff on May 9, and the parliamentary election on June 30. This series of nation wide elections was the first time that democratic elections were held by the people of Timor-Leste. Japan dispatched election observation teams on all three occasions. 14 electoral observers, including 5 national government officials and 9 individuals from the private sector, for the presidential election on April 9; 8 election observers, including 4 national government officials and 4 individuals from the private sector, for the presidential runoff on May 9; and 14 electoral observers, including 5 national government officials and 9 individuals from the private sector, for the parliamentary election on June 30. They were assigned to various districts to observe election campaigning, balloting preparations, voting, and ballot counting.

(9) Military Liaison Officers (expected in 2010)

On 16 March, 2010, Prime Minister Hatoyama, having a meeting with President of Timor-Leste, Ramos Horta, mentioned that Japan was going to consider a possibility of dispatching military liaison officers to UNMIT for the purpose of contributing to the country, especially at the final stage of UNMIT commitment to peacebuilding of Timor-Leste.

II. Development Assistance

1. International community

Turning now to another instrument, that is development assistance. Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990's, an increasing number of countries and areas have experienced regional conflicts and civil wars. Those are caused by piled antagonisms such as confrontations rooted in religious exclusiveness and ethnic differences, intertribal disputes, and scrambles for natural resources. In less developed countries in particular, domestic confrontations easily develop physical conflicts aggravated by chronic problems such as poverty and insufficient governance capacity. Once a conflict breaks out, the masses are likely to be caught up in it, and human rights violations arise with serious humanitarian problems resulting in large-scale refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). As conflicts paralyze economic and social foundations, years of the development efforts can be instantly destroyed, resulting in a huge amount of economic losses.

As a consequence, there is a growing consensus in the international community. In fact, one can cite many examples which seem to be an evidence of this global phenomenon. For example, Peacebuilding as a key word has been used frequently since Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then-Secretary General of the United Nations, published "Agenda for Peace" in 1992. Ever since, the donor community started to regard peacebuilding as one of the major missions in development assistance. The international development goals of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) cannot be achieved without realizing peace and stability as indispensable preconditions for sustainable development¹⁸. In times of conflict, how to eliminate threats against individuals and how to find ways to achieve peace are responsibilities of the international community. Poverty, ethnic disparities, confrontations over economic opportunities, and the lack of national integrity and consolidation, are crucial factors often comprising basic conditions of the conflicts. Therefore, emergency humanitarian aid and ODA for reconstruction, development, and democratization should play an important role, in addition to military and political approaches such as the United

¹⁸ UNDP/The Government of Timor-Leste(2009), The Millennium Development Goals, Timor-Leste, p.5, "The first MDG Report of Timor-Leste was prepared during 2003 and was launched in May 2004. A nationwide public information campaign on MDGs was undertaken in all 65 sub-districts to inform the people on the results of the poverty assessment, raise their awareness of MDGs, and promoted active participation by the people in the country's efforts to achieve human development. However, the first Timor-Leste MDG Report did not contain disaggregated data. The 2009 MDG report is published together with a local MDG report of a pilot district of Oecusse. The Oecusse report will help in disaggregating the data to bring out the rural and urban differences in the performance of each goal."

Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the deployment of multinational forces, preventive diplomacy and peace mediation¹⁹. There is a common understanding regarding peacebuilding based on the past arguments among the United Nations, other international organizations and major donors²⁰. It can be classified into three descriptions as follows;

- (1) In the broadest sense, peacebuilding covers every stage of conflict from pre-conflict, to during-conflict and to post-conflict, and also covers various sectors of activities. In the narrowest sense, on the other hand, peacebuilding indicates only post-conflict activities and is distinguished from political/military activities such as peacemaking and peacekeeping.
- (2) While peacebuilding and other peace operations such as peacemaking and peacekeeping refer to different activities, there is a wide consensus on the point that these activities are closely related to and sometimes overlap with one another.
- (3) Although conflict prevention and peacebuilding do not have the same meaning in all cases, among countries that have experienced conflict and are at risk of reoccurrence, they are considered to have nearly the same meaning. Activities for conflict prevention and for peacebuilding seem to overlap with each other.

At a practical level, in 1997, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) published guidelines. This document visualized the direction of development assistance for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and it was followed by new guidelines²¹ in 2001. Accompanying with those initiatives by OECD/DAC, bilateral donors began to discuss peacebuilding as an idea for aid policy. In 2007, OECD development ministers adopted a set of DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (see, Box3). That aims to strengthen a model of international engagement

¹⁹ There is an active movement which combines peace cooperation and development assistance among the international donors. For example, in Timor-Leste, UNDP works closely with the UN Country Team, international financial institutions as well as bilateral and multilateral agencies within the framework of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste established by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1704, of 2006, which underpins the “One UN approach (<http://www.tl.undp.org/>).

²⁰ MOFA(2006), Third Party Evaluation, Evaluation of Japan’s Peacebuilding Assistance Policy ~A Case Study: Afghanistan~

²¹ OECD/DAC(2001), The DAC Guidelines, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict

for the countries which are still behind. Those principles reflect a growing consensus that fragile states require a different type of approach in comparison to relatively better performing countries.

Under the leadership of OECD/DAC, among international organizations and major donors, five most needed countries, such as Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste²², are currently are listed as the most prioritized target of post-conflict assistance. These states face severe development challenges such as insecurity, weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, violence or the legacy of civil war. The results of commitment by the international community will be announced at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011.

In 2009, as a subsidiary body of OECD/DAC, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility, called INCAF²³ was established for the purpose of helping improve international commitment to development challenges in conflict related issues. The Network enables experts from governments and international organizations on peace, security, governance and development effectiveness to sit on the same table. It aims to work in close partnership with the United Nations, NATO, the World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral agencies. The Network and those bodies dedicate to development and peacebuilding issues, facilitating coordination among them to share experiences. It also associates actors of South-South cooperation through consultation and regular meetings. The Network pursues a whole-of-government approach to work so as to ensure more effective policy coherence,

²² UNDP began its involvement in Timor-Leste in December 1999, working initially with UNTAET, in the areas of rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Standard Basic Assistance Agreement (SBAA) signed on 20 May 2002 provided an early framework for UNDP's intervention in the country. At the same time, with independence in 2002 came a gradual move in programming focus beyond the necessities of post-conflict recovery, and towards a sustainable development strategy. UNDP proved quick in responding to the humanitarian emergency which occurred in the wake of the 2006 crisis, initiating Flash Appeal programs and creating a Crisis Prevention and Recovery portfolio with a focus on strengthening post-conflict governance, restoring local socio-economic foundations, and developing national capacity for disaster risk management and recovery. The Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2009-2013 has been formulated in partnership with state institutions including the Ministry of Economy and Development. The country program mirrors the priorities of the Fourth Constitutional Government's framework for promoting administrative reform and stabilization. It has benefited from various stakeholder consultations with the government, parliament and other state institutions, civil society and the United Nations (UN) system.

²³ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf>

coordination and complementarity. Based on a whole-of-government approach, INCAF tries to go beyond traditional aid management to examine substantive peacebuilding issues such as security, conflict prevention, and statebuilding.

2. Japan's ODA to Timor-Leste

Japan has been one of the top donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world. Therefore, there have been domestic and international calls and suggestions for more effective and efficient implementation of resources with better quality in the most needed sectors. Growing consensus at the global level on the importance of assistance to conflict issues apart from political and military approaches, Japan has made an active effort for peacebuilding through ODA. In the last decade, since peacebuilding has been identified as one of the priorities of Japan's ODA policy, there has been a significant increase in support in the form of emergency humanitarian relief during armed conflicts, assistance for expediting the settlement of conflicts, and assistance for the post-conflict consolidation of peace and nationbuilding²⁴ (see, Box2).

Since the end of the last century, Japan has frequently used the word "peacebuilding" in ODA policy documents as well as official speeches by its political leaders. At the G8 foreign ministers' meeting held in Miyazaki, Japan, in July 2000, the Japanese government manifested "Action from Japan on Conflict and Development." This was the first official announcement to introduce Japan's fundamental policy on conflict-affected countries and areas. Since then, Japan has provided diversified support through ODA to contribute to alleviating people's suffering at every stage of conflict cycles. In the ODA Charter revised in August 2003, the assistance to conflict-affected countries was set as one of the priority issues. In Japan's foreign policy, peacebuilding was adopted to be applied to development assistance in conflict prevention, emergency response, post-conflict support, and medium- and long-term development. Specific peacebuilding activities in the ODA Charter include the following reconstruction assistance: assistance to facilitate the peace process; humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance such as assistance for refugees and for the restoration of basic infrastructure; assistance for assuring domestic stability and security, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), and the collection and disposal of weapons, including demining; and assistance for reconstruction, including social and economic

²⁴ The earliest example where Japan played a principal role in conflict resolution was the assistance to Cambodia.

development and the enhancement of the administrative capabilities of governments. According to the new Medium-Term Policy on ODA formulated in 2005, the ultimate goal of peacebuilding is to prevent the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts, alleviate the various difficulties that people face during and immediately after conflicts, and subsequently achieve long-term stable development. In addition, in conflict-related situations, Japan's ODA policy incorporates the perspective of "Human Security" in protecting and empowering individuals at every stage of post-conflict reconstruction and development. In fact, Japan has worked towards this goal by cooperating with other stakeholders in order to bring peace and stability in the countries which have been shattered by conflicts and have lost enough capacity to govern, such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Timor-Leste.

In December 1999, celebrating the result of the popular consultation which led Timor-Leste an independent nation, Japan, leading other major donor countries, hosted the First Donor's Meeting for Timor-Leste in Tokyo. At the meeting, Japan pledged official development assistance that totaled US\$130 million for three years, with particular emphasis on infrastructure, agriculture and human resources development. Within this political framework, Japan has been supporting Japanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are active in Timor-Leste, with financial assistance amounting US\$1.46 million (since 2000) under the grassroots grant aid scheme.

Since the beginning of the bilateral cooperation with Timor-Leste, the Japanese government has been implementing its activities in association with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and is going to continue its support in accordance with the national development priorities designed by the Government of Timor-Leste, in order to ensure sustainable development for building a self-reliant nation. The targeted sectors of Japan's aid to Timor-Leste have ranged from infrastructure to emergency relief via both intergovernmental relations and international authorities. The amount of aid to Timor-Leste offered by Japan is situated at one of the top 5 major donors every year. Currently Japan focuses on following four priority areas in accordance with the national development policy of Timor-Leste. Moreover, Japan promotes partnership with other international aid agencies²⁵ and has been active in donor harmonization at the field level²⁶. The

²⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (for the period from 24 September 2009 to 20 January 2010) points out several socio-economic challenges such as Inclusive development agenda and policy dialogue, rural development and livelihoods, basic social services, education, internally displaced persons, and disaster preparedness and management.

statistical data available on OECD/DAC web page²⁷ also show the details of Japan's contribution to the development of Timor-Leste through its ODA.

(1) Agriculture and Rural Development: Agriculture provides employment opportunities and livelihoods for rural residents in Timor-Leste, which account for approximately 80% of the national population and plays a key role in poverty reduction as an early stage of long lasting development. Thus, Japan has allocated significant support resources to agriculture and rural development sector of the country.

(2) Maintenance and Improvement of Infrastructure: Reliable and durable infrastructure in the economic sector is the indispensable precondition for socio-economic development, which eventually offers equal and adequate opportunities of health service, education and economic activities. For this reason, Japan has provided its support for this sector in accordance with the national development plan formulated by the East Timorese government.

(3) Human Resources Development and Institution Building: Human resources of the public sector are bases of nation building and sustainable development. Many of the challenges have laid ahead in Timor-Leste. Japan has offered several training programs since 2000. In addition, Japan has arranged third country training programs collaborating with ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines as well

²⁶ JICA Timor-Leste Office (2008), JICA Timor-Leste Annual Report 2007, p.3-4. "JICA TL participated in Timor-Leste and Development Partners Meeting (TLDPM) in March 2008 as a member of Japanese delegation. TLDPM supported the National Priorities in 2008, consisting of six fields, and Japan expressed a continuous support to Timor-Leste with 20 million USD annually and requested self- help efforts for nation building as well as introduced a new JICA, which will start in October 2008. JICA TL will follow monitoring and evaluation of the National Priorities in 2008 together with donors. JICA TL participated in monthly development partners meetings at the Ministry of Finance since the new government launched in August and informal donors meetings at the World Bank every two weeks in order to share information and exchange opinions. In the field of agriculture, JICA TL participated in monthly harmonization meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery to share information between related donors and NGOs, and in particular discussed TOR of agribusiness promotion study with GTZ and USAID to clear demarcation between responsibilities of three organizations. JICA organized seminars regarding agribusiness and watershed management to invite the government, donors and NGOs to share outputs and gain momentum".

²⁷ <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacguide>

as Brazil. For a purpose of strengthening external assistance coordination, Japan dispatched an aid coordination advisor to the Ministry of Finance of Timor-Leste.

(4) Consolidation of Peace: For the newly independent nation, the consolidation of peace plays an important role in the nation building process. Japan has offered training programs such as capacity building for drafting laws on community police.

Conclusion

In this paper, the peacebuilding efforts toward Timor-Leste made by Japan are surveyed. Why has Japan been able to implement both peace cooperation and development assistance with such frequency and continuity? Through the examination of Japanese support, it seems reasonable to consider two factors below in attempting to sketch out characteristics of Japan's peacebuilding engagement in Timor-Leste.

In the first place, there is no disagreement on the point that Japan's diplomacy generally emphasizes on Asia. Since Timor-Leste is located in Southeast Asia, it is reasonable that Japan's diplomatic efforts concentrate on this country, comparing to other conflict-affected countries or areas. As a result, a series of international peace cooperation assignments have been realized and a massive amount of development assistance has been offered. Japan's regional strategy may account for its commitment to peacebuilding practice.

What is more, it is obvious that Japan's peace cooperation, mainly dispatching military and civilian personnel to UN missions, must be conducted within the legal framework of the International Peace Cooperation Law. The Law stipulates that Japan's peace cooperation shall be carried out according to the five principles. For example, the first principle requires that an agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflict and there are other conditions. In fact, among UN peacekeeping and political missions that are deployed in the world, many of them have not been considered to accord with those principles. In case of Timor-Leste, the conflict brought out in 1999 and the turmoil happened again in 2006, but based on the interpretation in the International Peace Cooperation Law of Japan, Timor-Leste has been in line with the five principles during the decade. Therefore, the most likely explanation is that a relatively stable conflict in Timor-Leste has enabled Japan to


repeatedly dispatch several peace cooperation assignments since 1999²⁸.

There are no other countries and areas where Japan's combined support of peace cooperation and development assistance has been implemented in such frequency and continuity. Nevertheless, while there can be no doubt that Japan has engaged much in Timor-Leste, there is still ambiguity as to the final goal for which Japan is heading in its peacebuilding support. It is because that there have been a number of contributing countries dispatching a large scale of personnel in order to resolve the conflict of Timor-Leste, and they have shown stronger commitment than Japan. Putting it another way, Japan's engagement in Timor-Leste may be interpreted as an ordinary one comparing to other contributors. With regard to the amount of development assistance, although it is sure that Japan has been ranked within the top 5 every year, its support has not been outstanding. It is not too far from the truth to say that Japan has not yet played a leading role in peacebuilding of Timor-Leste, forestalling other ambitious actors. Figures 1 and 2 probably can prove those hypotheses (see more detail, in Table 1 and 2).

Japan wishes to be a "Peace Fostering Nation". It is no exaggeration to say that the case of Timor-Leste seems to have been an ideal opportunity for Japan to be a protagonist. In spite of that, the efforts exerted so far still remain an unsettled question. That is how Japan tries to resolve conflicts and to settle peace in conflict-affected countries and areas. This point may well be left to argue.


²⁸ On the other hand, the cases in Iraq and Afghanistan, remind of the fact that Japan could not dispatch personnel through the International Peace Cooperation Law, although those are quiet hot issues in diplomacy.

Figure 1. Top donors in Timor-Leste



出典：http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacguide

Figure 2. Amount of Japan's ODA to Timor-Leste



出典：http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacguide

Box 1. Strength of UNMIT (30 April 2010)

Authorized

Security Council resolution 1704 of 25 August 2006

- 1,608 police personnel,
- 34 military liaison and staff officers, and an appropriate civilian component

Current (30 April 2010)

- 1,565 total uniformed personnel,
 - including 1,530 police and
 - 35 military liaison officers;
- 362 international civilian staff;
- 902 local civilian personnel;
- 173 UN Volunteers.

Country contributors

Military liaison and staff officers

Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Fiji, India, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone and Singapore.

Police personnel

Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Fatalities

- 4 police
- 2 local civilians
- 2 international civilian

8 total

Leadership

Special Representative of the Secretary-General : Ameerah Haq (Bangladesh)

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Governance Support,

Development and Humanitarian Coordination : Finn Reske-Nielsen (Denmark)

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Security Sector Support
and Rule of Law : Vacant

Police Commissioner : Luis Miguel Carrilho (Portugal)

出典 : <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmit/resolutions.shtml>

Box 2. Framework Featured in ODA Charter & Mid-Term Policy (Extracts)

Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter (August, 2003)

I. Philosophy —Objectives, Policies, and Priorities

1. Objective

The objectives of Japan's ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity. Furthermore, conflicts and terrorism are occurring more frequently and they are becoming even more serious issues. Preventing conflicts and terrorism, and efforts to build peace, as well as efforts to foster democratization, and to protect human rights and the dignity of individuals have become major issues inherent to the stability and development of the international community. Japan aspires for world peace. Actively promoting the aforementioned efforts with ODA and manifesting this posture both at home and abroad is the most suitable policy for gaining sympathy and support from the international community for Japan's position. Therefore, Japan's ODA will continue to play an important role in the years to come.

2. Basic Policy

(2) Perspective of "Human Security"

In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development. To ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan will extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals.

3. Priority Issues

(4) Peace-building

In order to prevent conflicts from arising in developing regions, it is important to comprehensively address various factors that cause conflicts. As part of such undertakings, Japan will carry out ODA to achieve poverty reduction and the correction of disparities, as referred to above. In addition to assistance for preventing conflicts and emergency humanitarian assistance in conflict

situations, Japan will extend bilateral and multilateral assistance flexibly and continuously for peace-building in accordance with the changing situation, ranging from assistance to expedite the ending of conflicts to assistance for the consolidation of peace and nation-building in post-conflict situations. For example, ODA will be used for: (a) assistance to facilitate the peace processes; (b) humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, such as assistance for displaced persons and for the restoration of basic infrastructure; (c) assistance for assuring domestic stability and security, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), and the collection and disposal of weapons, including de-mining; and (d) assistance for reconstruction, including social and economic development and the enhancement of the administrative capabilities of governments.

4. Priority Regions

Africa has a large number of least developed countries, and is affected by conflicts and serious development issues, amid which self-help efforts are being stepped up. Japan will provide assistance for these efforts. The Middle East is an important region for energy supply and for the peace and stability of the international community, but it has destabilizing factors including the situation of Middle East peace process. Japan will provide assistance towards social stability and the consolidation of peace.

II. Principle of ODA Implementation

(2) Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided.

(3) Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries' military expenditures, their development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, their export and import of arms, etc., so as to maintain and strengthen international peace and stability, including the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and from the viewpoint that developing countries should place appropriate priorities in the allocation of their resources on their own economic and social development.

Japan's Medium-Term Policy on ODA (February, 2005)

3. Priority Issues

(4) Peacebuilding

(a) Since the end of the Cold War, numerous regional and domestic conflicts have occurred. Not infrequently, conflicts have recurred after hostilities had once ceased. Conflicts bring about various problems, such as the creation of refugees and internal displaced persons, destruction of the social and economic infrastructure, and malfunctions in the governing structure. As a result, it becomes extremely difficult for people to maintain their lives, livelihoods and dignity, and development at the national and regional level is impeded. In this sense, peace and stability are prerequisites for development.

(b) The purpose of peace-building is to prevent the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts, alleviate the various difficulties that people face during and immediately after conflicts, and subsequently achieve long-term stable development. Assistance for the prevention of conflicts and in their closing stages, post-conflict emergency humanitarian assistance, and medium- to long-term reconstruction development assistance are essential to allow peace to take root. For example, employment generation and reconstruction of hospitals and schools through ODA enable people to sustain their livelihoods and gain access to education and health services. This in turn brings home to them the "dividends of peace," leading to peace and stability in a society. Assistance in peace-building needs to fully take into account and give consideration to promoting processes for peace, such as dialogue between opposing groups. The individual circumstances-political, social, historical and cultural-of each country and region must also be fully taken into account.

(c) Japan is determined to make an active contribution to peace-building in concert with international organizations, other donors, the domestic private sector, and NGOs.

出典 : http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/seisaku/taikou/taiko_030829.html

Box 3. The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Ensure all activities do no harm
3. Focus on state building as the central objective
4. Prioritize prevention
5. Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives
6. Promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”)

出典： <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/10/44282247.pdf>

Table 1. Total amount of Japan’s ODA to Timor-Leste (US\$ million)

Year	loan aid	grant aid	technical assistance	total
2004	N/A	6.06	3.82	9.88
2005	N/A	27.93	5.48	33.41
2006	N/A	18.02	3.81	21.83
2007	N/A	7.83	5.24	26.45
2008	N/A	21.20	5.24	26.45
total	N/A	114.56	43.16	157.73

出典： <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacguide>

Table2. Top 5 donors to Timor-Leste (US\$ million)

Year	1	2	3	4	5
2003	Portugal 42.69	Australia 28.87	USA 22.72	Japan 8.93	UK 7.38
2004	Australia 35.25	USA 27.19	Portugal 25.55	Japan 9.88	Norway 8.71
2005	Australia 38.02	Portugal 34.69	Japan 33.41	USA 19.90	Norway 9.08
2006	Australia 46.08	Portugal 38.50	Japan 21.83	USA 20.64	Norway 14.52
2007	Australia 83.35	Portugal 46.64	USA 25.06	Norway 13.45	Japan 13.07

出典： <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/dacguide>