

Transformation of UNPKO and Japanese Military Contribution
from 1992 to 2009

国連平和維持活動の変遷と日本の軍事要員派遣

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要 旨

本報告は、1992年6月15日に成立し、同年8月10日に施行された「国際連合平和維持活動等に対する協力に関する法律」(以下、国際平和協法力法)に基づく国連平和維持活動への軍事要員の派遣について、1992年から2009年末までの活動を分析し、今後の派遣について検討したものである¹。

国連平和維持活動は、第1世代と呼ばれる伝統的な平和維持活動に始まり、冷戦終結以降に顕在化した国内紛争に起因する国際の平和と安全に対する脅威へ対応するための多機能化、さらに国連憲章第7章の授權とさまざまな発展を遂げてきた。日本が国連平和維持活動に貢献するために、軍事要員を派遣するための法的枠組みを提供するのが国際平和協法力法であるが、これまでの日本の軍事要員派遣は、国外からは高い評価を受けてはいるものの、部隊の派遣は後方支援的な要素が強く、司令部要員の派遣は権限が小さいポジションに留まっている上に、派遣要員数が少ないという批判もあいまって、国際の平和と安全に対する目に見える人的貢献をしてきたとはいいがたい側面が強調されてきた。しかし一方で、カンボジアでの活動をはじめ、東ティモールでの平和構築支援活動、ネパール政治ミッションへの軍事監視要員の派遣等を分析してみると、現在的な国連平和維持活動および平和構築ニーズに応える活動を柔軟に実施してきており、現行法の下でも現在の国連平和維持活動へ対応することは十二分に可能であることがわかる。今後は、軍事要員派遣によって何をを目指すのか、如何に目に見える支援を打ち出していくのか、国民を巻き込んだ議論の上で実施していくことが重要であろう。

¹ 本報告の作成に当たっては、海外派遣を経験された自衛官および関係部局の皆様への聞き取り調査を行った。その際、陸上自衛隊中央即応集団司令部民生協力課および国際活動教育隊、陸上自衛隊幹部学校指揮幕僚課程の皆様にご協力いただいた。また、高井晋先生、菅原絵美氏、吉井愛氏、Mogana Suntahri氏からは、様々な側面でご支援を頂いた。心より深くお礼申し上げる次第である。

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, internal conflicts have been considered a new threat to international peace and security. The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) established in the early 1950s have been given comprehensive mandates to deal with post-conflict reconstruction, called 'peacebuilding'. The growing number of and demands for such UNPKO have resulted in an 'overstretching' of the capacity to respond. A newly published discussion paper titled 'New Horizon (2009)' aims at promoting the rebuilding of a new partnership towards a more flexible, effective, and efficient UNPKO mechanism. Japan is one of the member states that have non-permanent seats in the UN Security Council for 20 years in total which has made Japan one of the longest serving members among other non-permanent members. Hence, Japan has a role to play as a responsible partner in meeting the challenges of UNPKO. Before discussing what approach Japan should take, the question of why Japan contributes to UNPKO should be discussed among politicians, governmental officials and the public.

As one of the contributors to UNPKO, Japan has deployed military personnel since 1992 under the *Law Concerning Japan's Cooperation in the UN Peacekeeping Activity and other Activities* (the IPC law). It has often been pointed out that there is a gap between the transformation of UNPKO and Japanese legal restrictions for military deployment which has been constrained by the high standards of the five principles² which are articulated in the IPC law. The principles are carefully articulated not to circumvent Article of the Japanese Constitution which prohibits the use of military power. Yet in fact, Japan's military exercises show that Japan has adapted itself to the transformation of UNPKO and peacebuilding needs without amending the Constitution and with minor amendments to the law in 1992 and 2001.

The paper examines how the IPC law from 1992 to the end of 2009 has contributed to UNPKO through deep investigation of Japan's experiences with several interviews with deployed Japanese military personnel. It attempts to find a character

² The Five Principles: 1. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflict. 2. Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operation shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts. 3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts. 4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps may suspend International Peace Cooperation Assignments. Unless the requirements are satisfied again in a short term, the Government of Japan may terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignments. 5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.

of the Contribution and how Japan has responded to the recent needs and the transformation of UNPKO. The first section describes the recent development of UNPKO, particularly focusing on four generations of UNPKO, the peacebuilding tasks of multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions and the role of the military in the current context. In the second section, Japan's past military contribution under the IPC law is extensively analysed in relation to the following points: four categories and the current characteristics of UNPKO, two deployment types, and its activities.

I. Transformation of UNPKO

UNPKO are the primary instrument of the UN to maintain international peace and security. Historically, UNPKO have been a practical tool of UN security policies³. A new type of UNPKO has since appeared whose principal function is to support post-conflict reconstruction in the interests of national peacebuilding and of furthering regional stabilization, as well as global peace and security. Since its establishment, there are two fundamental aspects to the transformation of UNPKO, that is, the changing interpretation of the three principles on UNPKO and the UNPKO's structure. Before considering Japan's military deployment to UNPKO, this section reviews the development of various types of UNPKO, which are classified according to four generations.

1. Four Categories and Two Characteristics

First Generation: UNPKO are often classified into four categories called 'generations'. The first generation, sometimes called 'traditional' PKO, involves maintaining 'peace' as indicated by an absence of violent conflict, normally secured through ceasefire agreements with a minimum of military presence. The core activities of this generation are of mainly two types, military observation without any arms and maintenance of a military presence as a buffer between parties. The three basic principles of UNPKO—consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, which were clarified during the first generation's experiences of the Cold War period—have made UNPKO an effective security tool to maintain 'peace'. However, it is important to bear in mind that its successes often depend on the character of the dispute⁴, the extent of the mandate, and

³ Chadwick F. Alger, 'Thinking about the Future of the UN System', Global Governance, Vol.2, No.3, September-December 1996, p.341.

⁴ However, it has been pointed out that the protracted existence of UNPKO has often resulted in enmities becoming embedded and in a loss of political will to end the conflict.

the shared values of the international community, and changes in these conditions have induced the evolution of UNPKO after the end of the Cold War⁵.

As first generation PKOs, six missions have been deployed. They are the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). As the Table 1 shows, these are mostly composed of military sections, troops and military observers.

Table. 1 List of Traditional Peacekeeping Operations

Acronym	Start date	Closing date	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Int'l Civilians	Local Civilians	UNV	Total Personnel	Fatalities	Budget (US\$)
UNTSO	01/05/1948	Present	0	151	0	97	126	0	374	49	66,217,000(2008-10)
UNMOGIP	01/01/1949	Present	0	45	0	25	46	0	116	11	16,957,100 (2008-10)
UNFICYP	01/03/1964	Present	846	0	67	39	112	0	1064	179	54,412,700
UNDOF	01/06/1974	Present	1,038	0	0	37	105	0	1,180	43	45,029,700
UNIFIL	01/03/1978	Present	12,235	0	0	321	653	0	13,209	281	589,799,200
MINURSO	01/04/1991	Present	20	216	6	96	156	20	514	15	53,527,600

The data is based on DPKO HP at the end of 2009 <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/bnote.htm>

Second Generation and UNTAC: The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is a very famous example of the second generation UNPKO, comprising military, police, and civilian personnel and was given a peacebuilding mandate to support implementation of peace agreements in the aftermath of civil war. Similar UNPKO include the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In the case of UNTAC, one can observe not only its composition but also the challenges it faces in the new interpretation of the basic principles for dealing with the aftermath of civil war.

Under the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, UNTAC was delegated 'all powers necessary' by the Supreme National Council to ensure the implementation of the Agreement, which included a provision for the conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil

⁵ Hironobu Sakai, 'Legitimization of Measures to Secure Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: The Role of Chapter of the UN Charter', Public Interest Rules of International Law: Towards Effective Implementation, Ashgate Publishers, 2009, pp. 111-112.

administration, and the maintenance of law and order in a given mandate⁶. In exercising this large administrative power, UNTAC repeatedly requested that 'neutrality' in the politically fragile situation at that time be assured in the mandate document⁷. The position of UNTAC is completely different from that of the traditional PKO acting as a neutral buffer between two conflicting parties. Though it was required to be neutral in relation to the four Cambodian parties, it nonetheless stepped into the national political and military arenas in practice during that country's transitional phase.

After Pol Pot's party boycotted the national election and sabotage activities began, UNTAC decided to send a military unit to 'defend' the election⁸; it stopped demobilization of all personnel and allowed the units to use their own forces to repulse Pol Pot's party and secure the safety of polling stations⁹. This decision secured a success of election though it continued to use force only in self-defence¹⁰. This event shows the fluctuation of the basic principles of UNPKO when they face the challenge of implementing political activities in a fragile field situation where security vacuums exist. What should UNPKO do when the consent of parties is lost, how should they maintain their neutrality and impartiality when they are given a large mandate, protect their mission and civilians, and carry out their mandates with the minimum use of force? The UNTAC experience raises such questions.

Third Generation : The third generation, so-called 'peace enforcement' type of UNPKO, such as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the 1990s, was a risky and ambitious experiment. UNPKO authorized a coercive mandate under Chapter of the UN Charter, in which they were neither neutral nor impartial but became one of

⁶ UN Doc. A/47/608-S/23177 (30 Oct 1991).

<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N91/361/63/IMG/N9136163.pdf?OpenElement>

⁷ Such a stipulation can be found in Article and paragraph 1 in Section B in Annex 1.

⁸ 'The mission is not defending Cambodia. Therefore, the UNTAC Military Component will not be drawn into internal security operations. Nor is the mission to defend the political process but we are in Cambodia to defend an electoral process,' according to the force commander of UNTAC, John M. Sanderson, 'Preparation for, deployment and conduct of peacekeeping operations: a Cambodia snapshot', a paper presented at the conference on UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, Camberra 21-22 May 1993 p.10, quoted in Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, pp. 125-126.

⁹ Simon Chesterman, 'The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations' You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, Oxford University Press, London, 2004, p.15.

¹⁰ The fatalities by Malicious Act were 25 in UNTAC which includes Japanese UN Volunteer and his interpreter.

the actors in the conflict since they were mandated to end the conflict. It is the general understanding that these experiments failed, and the UN realized that enforcement of peace is not something the UN should and can do. UNPKO have not performed enforcement activities since then.

Fourth Generation : The recently deployed UNPKO called the fourth generation are the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). These appear to be a newly invented tool by the UN. Like the second generation PKO, their role is also a comprehensive one that aims to support post-conflict peacebuilding and authorized by Chapter , although they differ in terms of ‘integration’, will explain later.

The core tasks of the multi-dimensional UNPKO are, for example, election support, stabilization, Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR), rule of law, human rights, and so on. As they have been given a broader mandate, the fourth generation UNPKO are usually large missions and account for about 90% of the whole PKO budget. The large military component, which makes up 70% of a mission, shows the importance of military involvement in conducting the recent UNPKO.

Table. 2 List of Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations

Acronym	Start date	Closing date	Troops	Military Observers	Police	Int'l Civilians	Local Civilians	UNV	Total Personnel	Fatalities	Budget (US\$)
UNMIK	01/06/1999	Present	0	9	8	196	120	27	360	54	46,809,000
MONUC	01/11/1999	Present	16,844	705	1,089	1006	2,539	615	22,798	149	1,346,584,600
UNMIL	01/09/2003	Present	10,046	139	1,331	476	975	225	13,192	139	560,978,700
UNOCI	01/04/2004	Present	7,027	192	1,166	407	426	291	9,509	60	491,774,100
MINUSTAH	01/06/2004	Present	7,057	0	2,066	492	1,221	205	11,041	45	611,751,200
UNMIS	01/03/2005	Present	8,545	485	693	797	2,395	268	13,183	47	958,350,200
UNMIT	01/08/2006	Present	0	33	1,578	364	880	195	3,050	5	205,939,400
UNAMID	01/07/2007	Present	14,659	210	3,941	999	2,258	364	22,431	43	1,598,942,200
MINURCAT	01/09/2007	Present	2,368	21	248	398	302	112	3,449	1	690,753,100

The data is based on DPKO HP at the end of 2009 <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/bnote.htm>.

Chapter Authorization: UNPKO by authorizing the use of all means necessary under Chapter may be ‘denoting the legal basis for its action... [Its action] can also be seen as a statement of firm political resolve and a means of reminding the parties to a conflict and the wider United Nations membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council decisions’¹¹. Even these missions that have

¹¹ UN Doc., United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008,

Chapter authorization have not been regarded as the same as enforcement missions or third generation UNPKO, since these missions depend on the consent of the relevant parties; they accept not only the mission's deployment but also its mandates authorized under Chapter . So-called 'robust' PKO may exercise the use of force to protect their mandate against those who would disrupt the peace agreement. Thus they remain impartial as long as the consent of the parties is maintained. Despite the increasing need for UNPKO, the number of fatalities among mission personnel is increasing¹². In the post-conflict situation, small insurgencies and violence still erupt, and the UNPKO and UN agencies often become military targets. As a result, the multi-dimensional UNPKO must be robust in order to protect themselves and civilians, so is their mandate.

Integrated Mission, which began in 2007¹³, is 'the guidance principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development[al], humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social, and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy'¹⁴. Integration is an operational concept which brings together various UN agencies: all UN departments, programmes, funds, and specialized agencies; and the PKO to work in a coherent and efficient manner in both UN headquarters and field missions. This operational principle of 'integrated PKO' tries to maximize peacebuilding efforts under the integrated strategy. As illustrated in Figure 1, the integrated UNPKO have three main components: Military, Civilian, and Police. This structure is formed with accumulated experiences in the past as regards the best way to maximize peacebuilding efforts in areas such as the rule of law, military, and political activities; humanitarian assistance; and development. As pointed out in the famous 'Brahimi Report', peacekeeping and peacebuilding are 'inseparable partners' in complex peace operations¹⁵.

p.18.

http://peacekeepingresourcehub.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf

¹² Statistics of fatalities in UNPKO can be found at

<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/>

¹³ Note from the Secretary-General, Guidance on Integrated Missions, 9 February 2006.


<http://www.undg.org/docs/9899/Note-of-Guidance-on-Integrated-Missions-2006.pdf>

¹⁴ Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, 17 January 2006, para.4

<http://www.undg.org/docs/9899/Note-of-Guidance-on-Integrated-Missions-2006.pdf>

¹⁵ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 2000, para.28

http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/



The development of UNPKO as described above is a result of responding to changing demands in international security environments, by using the knowledge learnt by trial and error. The traditional UNPKO play an important role in maintaining peace. Such categorization of UNPKO is useful to understand their variety and development. However, it is important to note that every conflict has special characteristics; consequently, every mission should be tailor-made. Further, these characteristics of the four generations represent lessons learnt from past experiences and the changing will of the member states.

2. Peacebuilding and Military Component in UNPKO

UNPKO are unique in that they have both military and political capability; in addition, multi-dimensional UNPKO have the civilian components of peacebuilding expertise, such as police, development assistance and humanitarian support. How has the UN defined peacebuilding and the nexus between PKO missions, and peacebuilding supports at both conceptual and operational levels? This section clarifies

the role of the military components in the relationship between UNPKO and peacebuilding.


The most recent document of UNPKO principles and guidelines, titled Capstone Doctrine (2008)¹⁶, defines peacebuilding as follows:

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions¹⁷.

It is clear that the UN recognizes peacebuilding as ‘measures’ to create and strengthen social infrastructure to build sustainable peace and prevent resumption of conflict. The Capstone Doctrine explains that peace operations consist of five activities, such as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement and points out that the latter four activities may overlap, particularly in the early phase of peacebuilding (see Figure 2) when UNPKO are often deployed in the field.

Figure 2

UN Peace Operations



United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2008)

Then, what is expected of UNPKO in this phase? In the Capstone Doctrine, the core functions of a multi-dimensional UNPKO are clearly defined as follows:

¹⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, *op.cit.*

¹⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, *op.cit.* p.18.

- (a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- (b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- (c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner¹⁸.

These priorities show that the main functions of UNPKO are in the areas of politics and security and serve to create a coordination platform for all UN activities. The military provides a 'secure and stable environment' through their military presence and expertise and also the police component serves 'the rule of law and human rights' which are quoted in function (a). The civilian component, such as Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Elections mainly carries out function (b) and also human rights function (a); and all three components deal with function (c) as an integrated operation by sharing information, coordinating activities, and common logistics supports.

A recent report of the Secretary General on peacebuilding, which deals with the first two years after the end of a conflict, listed five peacebuilding priorities to provide support: (1) basic safety and security, (2) the political process, (3) the provision of basic services, (4) restoring core government functions, and (5) economic revitalization¹⁹. Items (1), (2), and (4) are identified as the main tasks for UNPKO using their military and political capability. On the other hand, as pointed out in the Capstone Doctrine, since UNPKO 'generally lack the programme funding and technical expertise'²⁰, a function (c) above, UNPKO 'assist' in points (5) and (3), but both of which are primarily conducted by UN agencies and other organizations²¹. This is a simplified explanation of the core functions of UNPKO in the peacebuilding context.

A military component in UNPKO could be divided into three categories; Force Headquarters (FHQ), Military Observation Section (UNMOs/MILOBs), and Formed Military Units (FMUs). Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) send their military personnel as special military experts to FHQ and UNMOs/MILOBs individually. On

¹⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, *op.cit.* p.23.

¹⁹ UN Doc., A63/881-S/2009/304, Report of the Secretary General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, 11 June 2009.

²⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, *op.cit.* p.26.

²¹ *Ibid*, p.29.

the other hand, FMUs are made up of military contingents and vary in size from platoons to battalions; each has a special function such as infantry, construction engineer, aviation, de-mining, and transport. FHQs control all military activities under a Force Commander (FC) of the rank of Major-General. In a military observation section, the United Nations Military Observers' main task includes monitoring various agreements on ceasefires, withdrawals, and demilitarization; patrolling both sides of the conflict, including the areas along the confrontation lines; and investigating allegations of aggression or ceasefire violations.

Military components definitely support these activities through their specialties and skills; for example, they create a secure environment for development and humanitarian activities by patrolling, providing protection, rescue, intelligence activities, and so on. Moreover, their military knowledge is considered necessary to identify weapons, soldiers for DDR projects, and Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The military component enables PKO to monitor and observe ceasefires, create a secure environment, counteract spoilers, protect civilians, and remove mines. It is important to recognize that current UNPKO require a large and well equipped military capability which enables them to operate a mission in fragile circumstances where infrastructure may be limited or destroyed, since only the military can deliver engineering, transportation, and logistics support functions under such harsh environment.

3. Current Agenda

The non-paper titled 'New Horizon²²', which was handed out by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), suggested that the current peacekeeping operations agenda is 'overstretched'. The scale of missions is overstretched in terms of the number of missions, personnel, budget, and complex mission mandates for peacebuilding. The UN's capacity to respond to all these needs is limited. The number of personnel has increased by about five times between 2000 and 2009; the budget has increased by about six times between 1997 and 2009; and eight large-scale missions, mainly in Africa, have been deployed since 2003. In addition, a robust peacebuilding mandate entails complex operations and requires special experts in various fields. Despite an increasing demand for trained personnel, the training and capacity-building tools for these

²² Department of Peacekeeping and Department of Field Support, [A New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon For UN Peacekeeping](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf), 2009.
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf>

personnel are still underdeveloped, and standardization of all personnel, especially military, is urgently needed.

New Horizon states that a key to overcoming this overstretching of resources is to build new strategic partnerships towards achievement of a common goal. How can Japan contribute to these agendas through deployment of military personnel?

II. Experiences under the Administration of the IPC Law

1. International Peace Cooperation Law

The term 'international peace cooperation (IPC)' is not commonly used in the world. Japan's efforts and response with regard to the international community in terms of financial, personnel, and material contributions, especially to conflict affected countries are expressed by this term. Through IPC efforts, Japan seeks to contribute to national peacebuilding, regional stabilization, and international peace and security, which conduce to Japan's own security. Sending military personnel to UNPKO under the IPC law forms a part of these efforts²³.

Japanese personnel contribution has been in small numbers until the most recent deployment to MINUSTAH. Until the end of 2009, Japan had deployed 4,931 military personnel in total²⁴ to seven UN missions including two in East Timor (UNTAET and later UNMISSET) and one each in Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the Golan Heights (UNDOF), Nepal (UNMIN), and Sudan (UNMIS). Further, as of the end of 2009, Japanese personnel dispatch was only 39 to three UN missions (UNDOF, UNMIN, and UNMIS) and ranked 84th among 116 TCCs²⁵. Among the 4,931 personnel, 96 were sent as individual military experts, and 4,835 were sent as formed military units. Unfortunately, the participation of female military personnel is extremely low, with only seven female personnel participating once in East Timor. Whereas the quantitative contribution of troops has been very low, Japan has been the second largest contributor financially to the UNPKO budget, providing 12.53% of funding.

Japan's long reluctance to engage in military deployment abroad was the result of legal restrictions, lack of political will, and public hesitance. However, after some military dispatches were undertaken under the *Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams (JDR)*, the *Law Concerning Special Measures on*

²³ Web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Japan's Initiatives in Peacebuilding', http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/peace_b/index.html

²⁴ As of 31 Dec 2009.

²⁵ After Japan has deployed an engineering unit and two SOs to MINUSTAH its rank became 51th.

Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law following *the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law*, public acceptance of military deployments abroad seems to be increasing²⁶.

In the Constitution, Japan has renounced its right to belligerency and collective self-defence. In order to accomplish that aim, Item 2 of Article states 'land, sea, and air force, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained'. The so-called 'Miyazawa four principles', named after the former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, notes the following points as conditions of Japanese military deployment under the IPC law: The activity (1) should be carried out within the framework of the Constitution and the IPC law, (2) should be supported by the public and engender a high international reputation, (3) should be considered from the point of view of preparedness to take all possible measures to ensure the safety and efficiency of deployed personnel, (4) should be an area that Japan can deal with appropriately. The Miyazawa principles are reflected in the 'five principles' in the IPC law to avoid integration of the 'use of force' and carefully limit the 'use of weapons' by deployed Japanese Military personnel and to ensure conformity with the Constitution.

It is important to note that the 'five principles' in the IPC law are based on the three basic UNPKO principles which were established during the Cold War; in this regard, if existing traditional UNPKO have restrictedly based on the basic principle, deployment in support of traditional UNPKO should not raise any issues of a breach of Constitution technically. Even after experiencing of UNPKO evolution during 1990's, the clearance of the five principles is still a crucial matter for Japan's military deployment to UNPKO under the IPC law. However, Chapter authorizations on UNPKO seem to be given secondary importance during its decision making process, since Japan has deployed its missions to Chapter authorized robust PKO such as UNTAET and later to UNMISSET, UNMIS, and MINUSTAH²⁷. In these cases, Japan carefully checked the area of deployment and gave mandates in conformity with the regulations specified in Article 3-() of the IPC law.

2. Historical Junctures

There are two historical junctures that have encouraged Japan's engagement

²⁶ The public opinion poll, taken by the Japanese Cabinet Office in October 2009, showed 80.4% of the public support Japan's participation in UNPKO. <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h21/h21-gaiko/2-3.html> accessed 10 January 2010.

²⁷ Hironobu Sakai, 'KOKUREN HEIWA IJIKATSUDO (PKO) NO ARATANA TENKAI TO NIHON,' *Journal of International law and diplomacy*, Vol.105, No.2, 2006, pp.145-174.

in IPC. The First Gulf War tested Japan's preparedness for a new world order. When the First Gulf War occurred in 1991, there was much discussion about sending the Self-Defence Force (SDF) abroad, which split public opinion at the time. Since the first attempts to have the United Nations Peace Cooperation Law (Kokuren Heiwa Kyouryoku Hou) was failed in the Diet, Japan has struggled to send its military abroad so that its contribution to international peace and security would go beyond what critics called 'cheque book diplomacy'. After the enactment of the IPC law in 1992 and up to 2001, there were only three deployments, namely, to UNTAC, ONUMOZ, and UNDOF, while UNPKO had increased. There were still some obstacles such as lack of political incentive and the antimilitaristic nature of the Japanese public.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States was the second turning point, which triggered Japan to accelerate the dispatch of military troops overseas. To emphasize the strong relationship between Japan and the US, the former Prime Minister Mr. Junichiro Koizumi who was strongly supported by Japanese citizens enabled two historic dispatches by creating two special legal measures. The epoch-making foreign dispatch of Japan SDF was a 'humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and support mission' operated by the Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF) and the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) in Iraq and Kuwait from January 2004 to June 2006. Further, the Maritime SDF (MSDF) was sent to provide logistical support in the Indian Ocean for *Operation Enduring Freedom* led by US and international coalition forces. Since then, it appears that the foreign dispatch of SDF to international peace cooperation activities has been broadly accepted by Japanese citizens and international expectations for Japan's military deployment have increased.

There is an obvious political tendency to increase the sending of military personnel on international peace cooperation missions, under either a bilateral or a multilateral framework. On 18 January 2008, the former Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Yasuo Fukuda outlined his vision in opening remarks to the Diet²⁸ that defined Japan as a 'peace-fostering nation (Heiwa Kyouryoku Kokka)' and he repeated this vision at Davos Forum on 26 January stating that peacebuilding is one of Japan's diplomatic pillars²⁹. Even after Japan experienced a historic political change in September 2009, the new government does not seem to have changed this basic principle in the

²⁸ The Opening Remarks by the Prime Minister Mr. Yasuo Fukuda at the 169th Diet on 18 January 2008. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hukudaspeech/2008/01/18housin.html> accessed 13 January 2010.

²⁹ Special Address by Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, on the occasion of the annual meeting of the world economic forum (Congress Centre, Davos, Switzerland 26 January 2008) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/economy/wef/2008/address-s.html> accessed 13 January 2010.

international peace cooperation arena³⁰. The most recent deployment was an engineer battalion to MINUSTAH in February 2010 (about 350 personnel), which might be another historic turning point in Japan's PKO dispatch. The outstandingly quick deployment within twelve days since the directive given by the Defence Minister exemplifies Japan's new endeavour with regard to military dispatches abroad.

3. Practices under the IPC law: A Responsible Back-seat Player?

Japan's past experiences of deployment to UNPKO could be characterized as a 'responsible supporter'. Since the Japanese Constitution prohibits the 'use of force', Japan's deployed military personnel and units must avoid integrating into the 'use of force' activities of other actors. This factor has influenced the areas of Japanese military contribution in UNPKO. This section examines the past experience of Japan's military contribution to UNPKO under the IPC law, according to four categories and current characteristics of UNPKO, two deployment types, and its activities.

As mentioned, the 'five principles' are given due consideration when a deployment decision is made, but experience shows that Japan can participate every generation type of mission under the current legal system. Among above mentioned seven UN missions, UNDOF is the only traditional UNPKO that Japan has experienced. Japan has sent six arms monitors (AMs) to a political mission UNMIN, which is administrated by the UN Department of Political Affairs. The other missions were all multi-dimensional PKOs, especially UNTAET, UNMISSET, and UNMIS are fourth generation missions under Chapter VII authorization. It should be noted that Japan has contributed to the integrated mission, by dispatching a Database Development and Maintenance Officer to UNMIS Joint Mission Analysis Centre, which is a newly created section to 'ensure that all peacekeeping missions have in place integrated operations monitoring, reporting and information analysis hubs at Mission headquarters to support the more effective integration of mission-wide situational awareness, security information and analysis for management decision making'³¹.

As explained in the section I-2, TCCs deployed their personnel to UNPKO military components in two ways, i.e., sending individual military experts and deploying formed units. Staff Officers (SOs) who work in the FHQ and as MOs/AMs in

³⁰ A Speech by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, at the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly (September 24, 2009)

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/assembly2009/pm0924-2.html>,

³¹ DPKO Policy Directive, Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres, 1 July 2006, p.2.

the military observation section or the arms monitor section are deployed on an individual basis. Japan has sent 16 (eight personnel twice) MOs to UNTAC and ten (five personnel twice) SOs to ONUMOZ, 29 (two personnel 13 times plus three personnel since Feb 2009) to UNDOF, 17 SOs to UNTAET and UNMISSET, 6 (two personnel three times) to UNMIS and 18 (six personnel three times) AMs to UNMIN.

Individual personnel sent as SOs to headquarters are expected to act as liaisons of the FMU by coordinating between the SDF units sent and UNPKO headquarters. Basically, all TCCs contributing to formed units are expected to be represented at the FHQ. These SOs' positions at FHQ have been limited to administrative tasks such as logistics, public relations, database management, and transportation. A management position that is normally taken by an officer at the rank of Colonel or higher, who can engage in the planning of strategy and operations, has never been assigned. Importantly, the military rank of Japanese officers sent to FHQ is either Lieutenant Colonel, Major or Captain as 'staff'. It limits its contribution and assigns them low authority in the mission. These unit functions and officers' positions are certainly important for the mission's maintenance and operation; however, they could be considered supportive and not principal roles. The practice of sending a higher ranked officer to FHQ when an FMU is sent is an important aspect of intelligence gathering and promoting Japanese contribution within a mission. Two SOs, a Logistics Officer and a Database Development and Maintenance Officer in UNMIS are a rare case among others in the past, since Japan had not deployed units.

It should be mentioned that some Japanese AMs in UNMIN have been playing important roles in the mission with their high reputation of working diligence. Some personnel have been assigned as the leader of a monitoring team which is normally composed of three personnel who have different nationality³². Japanese AMs have also been assigned to SO position in UNMIN Arms Monitor Headquarters such as an Information Officer and a Senior Training Officer³³. These examples show that Japanese military personnel have enough capability to play a responsible role in FHQ and expectation from others is high.

On the other hand, sending individual personnel, such as MOs/AMs, should be done more frequently. MOs were sent only to UNTAC in 1992 and AMs have been sent to UNMIN since 2007. The deployment of non-armed and uniformed military personnel seemed a suitable way for Japan to make contribution. Since they do not

³² According to an interview with deployed UNMIN personnel.

³³ Interviews with UNMIN deployed Japanese personnel on 15 and 26 October 2009. Some additional information after interviews has been gained through e-mail exchanges.

carry weapons and wear non-military uniform, the issues raised by *Ittaika*³⁴ are not relevant. The activities of AMs in UNMIN that are involved in monitoring and observing Maoist Camps and arms storages have assisted in promoting the peace process. Thus Japan can contribute to peacebuilding efforts as regard to DDR and SSR processes, by providing military specialists to identify military personnel and weapons, monitoring military camps, and gathering related information.

Japan has deployed 4,835 personnel to FMUs for five UNPKO missions. Their main functions have been either in engineering or transport. Almost all of them are at the battalion or company level; Engineer battalions have been sent to UNTAC, UNMISSET, and UNTAET, movement control units to ONUMOZ, transportation units to UNDOF. Basically, these are logistics functions and the first aim of these is support of a mission's core task. The core task of military units which was mentioned in I.2 is to act as so-called Peacekeeping Forces (PKF), which mainly consist of infantries mandated to patrol, defend, protect, and maintain security and order in an area. The IPC law stipulated 17 assignments (see Table 3); FMOs can participate in all except (g), (h), (i), and individual military personnel can participate in all. No units had ever been assigned to the PKF activities, which had been frozen up to 2001. After the IPC law was revised in 2001, Japan became able to conduct PKF activities both technically and legally; however, it has sent no FMU mission to PKF assignments. The endorsement of the Diet was required to send FMU as a PKF missions. One assumes that there is still some hesitation over taking such a responsibility and burden in foreign operations, and thus politics and the public are not yet ready to accept the challenge³⁵.

³⁴ *Ittaika* means to 'form an integral component of' use of force by another party which arguably violates Article of the Japanese Constitution.

³⁵ There is an interesting Article in Mainichi Shinbun in 15 Feb 2010, where a command JSDF staff is quoted as saying that when he found the word 'engineering' in the SG's call for MINUSTAH military deployment, he thought Japan could send troops.

Table 3. International Peace Cooperation Assignments under the PKO law

International Peace Cooperation Assignments		Unit	Individual
a	Monitoring of Cease-Fire/Demobilization	○	○
b	Stationing and Patrolling	○	○
c	Weapons Inspection	PKF Activities	○
d	Collection, Storage, or Disposal of Abandoned Weapons		○
e	Assistance for Cease-fire Line Setting		○
f	Assistance for Exchange of POW		○
g	Monitoring of Election	/	○
h	Advice or Guidance for Police Administration		○
i	Advice or Guidance for General Administration		○
j	Medical Care	○	○
k	Search for /Rescue of Affected People and Assistance for Repatriation	○	○
l	Distribution of Daily Necessities to Affected People	○	○
n	Installation of Facilities/Equipments Damaged by Conflict	○	○
m	Repair/Maintenance of Facilities/Equipments Damaged by Conflict	○	○
o	Restoration of Environment Damaged by Pollution/Conflicts	○	○
p	Transportation, Storage, Communication, or Construction	○	○
q	Other Activities Similar to Above prescribed by Cabinet Order	○	○

The activities of engineering units in UNTAC, UNMISSET and UNTAET should be specially focused, since it has high reputation for high skill and equipment. For the first time, the deployment to UNTAET and later UNMISSET involved peacebuilding support projects such as landscaping the grounds of elementary schools and cultural exchange programmes with local communities.

Japanese personnel have gained a high reputation internationally because of their qualifications, punctuality at work, and disciplined work attitudes. From the perspective of their impact on peacebuilding in the field, sending an engineering unit to reconstruct roads, buildings, and schools is not only essential but also a good way to contribute to peacebuilding. On the other hand, the political mileage and direct peacebuilding impact generated by a transportation unit, or an SO's office work at a mission's headquarter are difficult to measure; nevertheless, these contributions of deployed personnel are very important and greatly admired.

It is important to note that TCCs are responsible for the operational and logistical preparation of all personnel and equipments; in addition, they are responsible for supplying national personnel as a National Support Element (NSE)

and for logistical support of contingents³⁶. When TCCs send their units to UNPKO, equipment needed to implement the given mandate has to be prepared by the contributing country itself. In this respect, units sent to missions like UNTAC, ONUMOZ, UNTAET/UNMIS, and UNDOF have a transport support contingent. These personnel are not counted as personnel contribution to UNPKO but counted as members of the International Peace Cooperation Corps under the IPC law. MSDF and ASDF have provided logistics support for FMUs with C-130 transport planes and U-4 multipurpose assistance planes with the supply ship Towada, transport ships Miura, Ojika, Osumi, and Escort ship Mineyuki.

The duration of Japan's past contribution to UNPKO was generally consistent. In the early 90s, missions like UNTAC and ONUMOZ were intensive and a short term, lasting about two years, and withdrawn after the first national election. Currently, UNPKO have difficulty in predicting their exit, and the deployment period has been extended to more than two years; hence, Japan's deployment period has likewise, extended. The mission to UNDOF has continued for 14 years since it began in 1996; also, the deployment to UNMIN, which started at almost the same time as UNMIN's establishment, has continued for more than three years.

Conclusion

The strength and uniqueness of Japan's contribution to UNPKO through deploying its military personnel should be re-examined in relation to the needs of multi-dimensional UNPKO and broad peacebuilding efforts. There is no doubt that Japan can deploy and contribute to multi-dimensional, robust, and integrated UNPKO as it has done in UNTAET, UNMIS, and MINUSTAH.

The Japanese military, SDF, is highly respected given its personnel's strong-discipline, high skill level, and high quality of work. Their work has positioned Japan as a responsible international peace cooperation partner; however, their political role in missions has been modest and supportive. The small number deployed on missions makes it difficult to accumulate experience and demonstrate the SDF's contribution to the UNPKO framework. As a future agenda, especially on the basis of recent trends and the needs of UNPKO, a comprehensive dispatch of Japanese civilian, police, and military personnel might be a good option to highlight Japan's contribution under the IPC law. Upgrading of the deployed commander at a mission's headquarters should be considered to enable that person to take on more responsibility. Moreover,

³⁶ Department of Peacekeeping Operations Force Generation Service, Guideline for TCCs Deploying Military Units to UNMIS, May 2005, p.27.

more female military personnel should be involved in Japanese missions, which might lend a unique and important characteristic as a new model of Japanese future deployment.

For increasing Japanese deployment, it is important to note that there is a possibility of causing negative side effects from military deployment in a third country. Even if the deployment is for a 'good' humanitarian and reconstruction purpose, a negative impact or humiliation as a result of the presence of foreign military might occur, especially that caused by discord of conduct such as gender-based violence³⁷. Pre-deployment training is important in order to standardize its personnel and not to lose the trust and credibility that past contributors have won.

Sending its military overseas is a way to achieve both the national and international interests through using Japan's asset, SDF. The important thing is to discuss what Japan wants to achieve and how to achieve the goal by using this asset both at the political level and in public discourse. Sending military personnel to UNPKO is a favourable option for Japan. When Japan deploys its military overseas, it should be considered as a positive contribution to international peace and security, especially peacebuilding. In this regard, serious consideration should be given to using this asset both within a UN and non-UN framework as a responsible peaceful nation.

³⁷ See, Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur, Unintended consequence of peacekeeping operations, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2007.