Contextual Analysis of Japanese In-Kind Contribution to International Humanitarian Relief Efforts: The Cases of Rwanda and East Timor

国際平和協力本部事務局による国際人道支援のための物資協力業務を振り返って（ルワンダ、東ティモール物資協力業務とその背景の考察）

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要　旨

本研究では、国際平和協力本部事務局（以下、事務局と省略）が過去１７年間に行った２１回に渡る物資協力業務中、平成６年度のルワンダ難民に対する物資協力支援の事例と、平成１１年度の東ティモール難民に対する物資支援の事例を分析した。事例分析は、各事例の外的環境を多角的に検討し、その後、事務局の物資協力業務の流れを考察する形をとった。外的環境としては、国際３要素（１．国連平和維持活動制度　２．国際人道支援制度　３．国際人道組織の対応)、国内１要素（４．国内政治情勢及び関連省庁の政策）の４要素を検討した。外的環境の総括としては、ルワンダ物資協力が行われた平成６年は、１．国連ＰＫＯの失敗と多国籍軍の介入が主流になる兆しの現れ、２．国際人道支援機関間の協力制度強化に向けての改革の難航、３．偶発的で大規模な人道支援活動、４．アフリカの一国に対し人道支援を行うことに肯定的であった国内政策の出現とした。東ティモールの物資協力が行われた平成１１年は、１．国家建設型ＰＫＯの台頭、２．ルワンダ事例と同様、国際人道支援機関間の協力制度強化に向けての改革の難航、３．国連主導型の迅速な支援活動、４．２分化された対東南アジア地域安全保障政策と経済安定化政策とした。事務局業務の考察は、援助物資要請機関からの公式要請日から、実際に支援物資が現地に届くまでの期間の業務経緯を、時系列で整理する形をとった。２事例における対応速度を比較し、平成９年に設置された備蓄倉庫の設置が、迅速性に影響を与えたか否かを検討した。結果は、迅速性において影響はなく、(備蓄倉庫から物資が出た東ティモール事例の方が対応により時間を要した)、備蓄倉庫の意義は、供与物資の量が増えることになるのではないかとした。さらに、上述の４つの外的環境要素を比較検討し、今後、物資協力対応の迅速性の向上を図るためには、適切な情報収集システムを構築することが重要ではないかと提案した。

Introduction

In 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCH) was established within the Prime Minister's Office of the Japanese government to carry out the mandate of the International Peace Co-operation Law (IPCL).[1] Over the subsequent 17 years, the IPCH dispatched a total of 6,016 personnel to 23 United Nations peacekeeping missions in 14 different countries.[2] Both Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel and civilian officials were assigned to the UN missions, playing various roles, including cease-fire monitoring, logistical support, election monitoring, humanitarian relief, and so forth. Of the 23 missions, only five – Rwanda, East Timor, Afghanistan, and two to Iraq – were humanitarian in nature. During these five missions, the IPCH dispatched both SDF personnel and civilian officials to assist refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) directly and indirectly.[3]

The IPCH's efforts to support peacekeeping have not been limited to the dispatch of personnel. It has also donated items to UN peacekeeping missions and to UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies 21 times over the past 17 years. The items have included such things as refugee relief supplies and materials to facilitate the running of elections, as well as construction materials for temporary housing for dispatched SDF personnel.

During some crises, the IPCH extended only personnel support, and during others it extended only material support. And there were several missions for which the IPCH extended both types. For instance, during the five humanitarian cases mentioned above, the IPCH dispatched personnel and donated refugee relief supplies to UN humanitarian agencies, primarily the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to support their operations.

The Rwandan and the East Timorese cases are the first and the second cases of the IPCH extending both personnel and material for humanitarian relief purposes. During the Rwandan crisis of 1994, the IPCH donated refugee relief items to UNHCR,

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[1] The Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations is abbreviated as the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL).

[2] The total number of personnel dispatched is tallied based on the number of people assigned to the 23 UN missions. The duration of the assignments ranged from three days to over one year. One person may be counted multiple times, for instance, someone serving on three different assignments would be counted as three persons. Therefore, the personnel figure overstates the number of actual people who served during the 23 UN missions. Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.

[3] Humanitarian missions to help Iraqi refugees were conducted twice. The first one was March–April 2003, and the second was July–August 2003. Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.

marking the first time it provided humanitarian supplies since the establishment of the IPCL.[4] Following its provision of the supplies, the IPCH carried out refugee-relief operations under which about 400 SDF personnel served for three months in 1994.[5] During the crisis in East Timor in 1999, the IPCH also extended both material and personnel to UNHCR for humanitarian relief purposes; it provided relief supplies for UNHCR, followed by the sending of a SDF taskforce that airlifted relief items on behalf of UNHCR.[6]

This paper reviews the international and domestic contexts of the IPCH's two humanitarian in-kind contribution operations in Rwanda and East Timor. In doing so, the paper intends to shed light on some of the international and domestic factors that led the IPCH to offer both material and personnel overseas. Since the IPCH promotes aid of both types under the guiding principle of "aid visibly tied to Japan," a contextual analysis of IPCH's operations in 1994 and 1999 may offer some insights for policy makers interested in developing a peacekeeping support formula that embodies the sprit of the IPCL.

The IPCH carried out these two in-kind contribution operations, and subsequent personnel-dispatching assignments, against the backdrop of many international and domestic contexts – contexts that generated policy discussions that enabled the operations – but the scope of this paper is limited to four of them. The first is the international peacekeeping regime, whereby supranational institutions (such as the UN), national governments, and sub-national institutions (such as the military) plan and execute international peacekeeping activities under sets of norms and rules. The second context is the international humanitarian regime, whereby different sets of institutions cooperate on international humanitarian operations under different sets of norms and rules. The third context is that of international humanitarian response. While this context is related to the workings of the existing international humanitarian regime, this paper reviews humanitarian response separately. Since Japan tends to thoroughly review other donors' moves prior to acting, international humanitarian reactions on their own are worth examining as something that influences the formulation of Japanese policy. The fourth context is that of the domestic political

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[4] The relief items provided to Rwandan refugees and IDPs were: 3,550 blankets, 2,600 sleeping mats, 1,000 shovels, 43 large tents, 213 jerry (fuel) cans, and a set of emergency and non-emergency medical kit. Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.

[5] Miner et al.,1996, p. 135.

[6] Items provided were: 20,000 jerry cans, 11,140 sleeping mats, 9,000 blankets, 5,120 plastic sheets and 500 tents. Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.

climate in Japan. To examine this context, the paper focuses on policy initiatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which are the two ministries mandated to engage in international cooperation and peacekeeping. By looking at these four contextual dimensions, this paper intends to create a narrative framework behind the IPCH's two in-kind contribution operations in Rwanda and East Timor, so that policymakers may have a broad overview of their past decisions.

As for the types of operations, the paper focuses only on the IPCH's in-kind contributions. Donation of supplies has been less controversial in Japan than the deployment of SDF personnel, as this sort of operation appears less risky in terms of potential loss of life. As such, in-kind operations have not been studied as closely by policymakers, and for their part, critics have tended to focus on the legal and political ramifications of dispatching the SDF to UN peacekeeping missions. The paper intends to provide some perspectives on the unexplored area of in-kind contributions.

This paper also limits its examination of the IPCH's operations to humanitarian activities. The initial reason for choosing humanitarian operations over UN peacekeeping and election monitoring was to examine the problem of the operational and thematic discontinuity between the relief and the development phases in international aid missions, and to explore the IPCH's ability to implement relief operations that smoothly connect to the development phase.

International attention toward bridging this relief-development gap existed for only a short period of time, however. The height of the discussion came when then UNHCR Commissioner Sadako Ogata and then World Bank President James Wolfenson launched the Brookings Process in 1999 to discuss problems related to this gap. Subsequently, policymakers agreed to implement several projects to address the problem. Although the Brookings Process brought some welcome results to the international aid community – such as increased funding for previously under-funded areas – the momentum was eventually lost, partly because pilot projects were halted,[7] and partly because Ogata went on to resign from UNHCR in 2001. After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the gap-filling discourse was overshadowed by new concerns concerning the reconstruction of post-conflict failed states.

Although the discussions on the gap between the relief and the development phases proved to be a fleeting agenda topic in the international aid community, humanitarian assistance remains an area where Japan could do more. The IPCH is indeed uniquely positioned to provide relief in post-conflict areas, through both dispatching personnel and sending supplies. Originally, the IPCL was created to fill

[7] Takasu, 2001, p. 60.

the legal lacuna of the International Disaster Relief Law (JDR Law) of 1987 – some aspects of humanitarian relief during complex emergencies cannot be addressed within the framework of that law. For instance, under the law, relief operations cannot be conducted in regions that do not meet its safety criteria.[8] In the 1990s, however, the line between the battle zone and the relief area blurred, and it became increasingly necessary for civilians and armed forces to cooperate. As such, it became sensible to have a framework so that the two camps could work together on humanitarian-oriented operations. Today, the IPCL allows the Japanese government to participate in international humanitarian relief efforts that may require partnering with military contingents.

Although it has become increasingly necessary for humanitarian actors to cooperate or even integrate with armed forces in order to effectively operate in complex emergencies, many actors strive to maintain the right balance between effectiveness, which can be raised via cooperation, and autonomy, or in other words the adherence to humanitarian principles. After all, the international humanitarian movement began as an undertaking separate from international political decisions, and relief actors place great importance on adhering to this original spirit. It is therefore worth reviewing how such humanitarian actors have worked with those within the peacekeeping regime, who typically operate according to the demands of international political realities.

This paper first examines the aforementioned four contexts as seen before and after the Rwandan crisis in 1994. Next, it discusses how the IPCH implemented its in-kind operation to assist Rwandan refugees. It then conducts a similar analysis on the East Timorese crisis in 1999. Finally, drawing upon the examination of these two cases, the paper offers some policy prescriptions in the concluding section.

I. Case One: Rwanda

1. Contextual analysis of the Rwandan crisis in 1994

(i) The international peacekeeping regime in the mid-1990s

The complete failure of the UN to prevent or halt the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is well documented. Throughout the genocide of Tutsis and politically moderate Hutus by Hutu extremists, the UN was essentially impotent. By the time the killing was brought to a halt three months later with the establishment of a government by the Tutsi-led Revolutionary Patriotic Front on July 19, between 500,000 and 800,000 people

[8] Regarding the safety criteria, see Institute for International Cooperation, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). JICA, 2002, p. 9.

had been killed, and over one million had fled to neighboring countries.[9]

This failed UN peacekeeping mission, alongside two other wobbling missions in Somalia and Bosnia, severely eroded support for UN peacekeeping operations among the organization's member states. Some refer to this string of failed peacekeeping efforts as the third generation of UN peacekeeping.[10] These missions were marked by their inability to broker peace due to their vague and insufficient UN mandates, as well as to the difficulty of maintaining order in environments where there was "no peace to keep."[11]

Having realized that the existing UN peacekeeping framework was insufficient for complex emergencies, member states began to turn away from the UN in their major peacekeeping initiatives. In the second half of the 1990s, member states increasingly turned to multilateral frameworks to enforce peace.[12] This did not mean, however, that UN officials had given up pursuing the organization's peacekeeping raison d'être. Rather, the UN was quietly reviewing its peacekeeping approach to make it more relevant to the rapidly changing nature of conflict. The peacekeeping failures of the first half of the 1990s would fundamentally alter the way UN officials looked at peacekeeping over the following 10 years.

(ii) The international humanitarian regime prior to the mid-1990s

(a) Cooperation among humanitarian actors: Establishment of DHA

Throughout the 1990s, the discussion over international humanitarian response revolved around the old agenda of establishing a better coordination mechanism. As the UN offices responsible for coordinating relief operations repeatedly encountered difficulties due to their inability to forge concerted responses, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) moved to ameliorate structural deficiencies by establishing – or renaming – offices within the UN Secretariat.

The initial momentum for reform came as a result of UN member states' frustrations on unsatisfactory responses to the Gulf War in 1991 by the Office of the

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[9] Des Forges, 1999.

[10] For example, see Doyle et al., 2006, pp. 15-17.

[11] Malan, 1998, para. 2.

[12] In the late 1990s, UN member states turned to regional non-UN peacekeeping operations to broker peace. Examples of this are military interventions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Sierra Leone; by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan; and by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the former Yugoslavia. See Malan, Op. cit.; Durch also notes that there were only two UN peacekeeping missions from 1995 through 1999: "one robust operation in eastern Croatia and a police monitoring mission in Bosnia … both were backed up by NATO military power." Durch, 2001, p. 2.

United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO), which was responsible for coordinating the responses of the six UN humanitarian agencies.[13] Momentum was also accelerated by the need to incorporate an increasing number of humanitarian organizations into a framework of concerted international response.

The core element of this reform was replacing UNDRO with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The reform was intended to facilitate cooperation between UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations and give DHA a better field presence and operational flexibility than its predecessor.[14] Furthermore, the UNGA formed the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC), a joint policymaking body, intending that it should function as a forum for policy collaboration among major humanitarian organizations. A centralized funding scheme was also introduced. Against the backdrop of a new international order rapidly coming about after the end of the Cold War, this reform marked the first large-scale attempt to overcome the obstacles to coordination between key humanitarian actors.

The results of the reform were mixed. Although DHA's performance during the Rwandan crisis was by and large viewed positively, critics argued that the reform did not generate the results that had been expected,[15] claiming that DHA was unable to effectively fulfill its duties.

The major reason for DHA's limited impact on the coordination of humanitarian actors lay in the way such organizations were going about their business. Prior to the end of the Cold War, humanitarian actors worked independently without clear inter-organizational standards or agreements. Relief delivery was the province of specialized UN humanitarian agencies that had their own mandates, private humanitarian actors – like organizations that supported the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement– and numerous NGOs. Each organization had different operational protocols and mandates, and it was only after the end of the Cold War that

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[13] Kehler argues that UNDRO's deficiencies included separate treaties and governance mechanisms of its member agencies (Reindrop, 2002), its limited share of deployed resources, and a limited field presence (Burton, 1993)." See Kehler, 2004. p. 4.

[14] This new relief framework was based on UN General Assembly Resolution 182, "Strengthening of the co-ordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations," issued Dec. 19, 1991. This resolution established the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), the Interagency Standing Committee, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, and the Consolidated Appeals Process. See A/RES/46/182, 19 Dec. 1996.

[15] Weiss noted that it was only a "cosmetic" reform; Cuenod argued that it lacked a "natural constituency to support and promote [the new office's] success" and it had "no money, little experience [and] no stockpiles." Martin wrote that the "problems of bureaucratic inefficiencies, lack of centralized authority, insufficient resources and uncoordinated activities remained unsolved." See Martin, 2000, p. 32.

these actors began to find themselves on common ground, including amid complex emergencies.

At first, the newly established DHA had only minimal leverage when it came to fulfilling its role of coordinating these various actors. The new funding scheme did not work well either, as funding DHA meant diverting money from core UN humanitarian agencies. Since the heads of these agencies were essentially more powerful than the head of DHA – whose rank was Under Secretary-General of the UN Secretariat – DHA suffered from a serious lack of resources. The robust coordination of major humanitarian actors is critical to effective international response, but DHA was unable to effectively fulfill this task.

(iii) International humanitarian responses to the Rwandan crisis

(a) Cooperation among humanitarian actors

The Rwandan genocide took place against the backdrop of disappointing UN peacekeeping efforts and thorny UN-led reform for better interagency relief coordination. Ironically, the political indifference that permeated the West and the resultant horrendous genocide accelerated the momentum for massive international humanitarian response. Once the genocide was over and the new Rwandan government was established, the international community reacted in a concerted fashion to provide relief. The financial contribution to assist Rwandan refugees and IDPs, much of which given by major donor governments, was one of the largest sums for a relief effort in the 1990s. About 1.2 billion dollars was allocated to humanitarian agencies assisting Rwandan refugees and IDPs in 1994, of which UN agencies received approximately 50%, Red Cross/Crescent 16%, and NGOs 20%.[16]

The organizations that provided humanitarian relief within and outside Rwanda apparently coordinated well with each other. At least eight UN agencies and eight military contingents, as well as some 250 local and international NGOs responded to the crisis.[17] While the level of inter-organizational coordination varied, those conducting cross-border operations were reported to have worked under "an orderly, cohesive and well-coordinated system."[18] The coordinated effort led by DHA was evaluated highly, with DHA said to have "achieved greater effectiveness on the ground and a new level of respect among aid agencies, donors and host government

[16] The UN Humanitarian agencies that received most of the funding were UNHCR, UNICEF and the WFP. See Borton, 1996, Figure 3; See also Udenrings Ministeriet Dania, fig. 3.
[17] Kehler, Op. cit., p. 18.
[18] Ibid., p. 22.

authorities."[19] Among the factors that contributed to the effective coordination was UNHCR's effort to limit the number of partner organizations working in refugee camps. The robust funding of numerous relief organizations was another critical factor for the harmonious cooperation.

Despite the positive reviews of how humanitarian actors worked together, this was no perfect relief campaign. First, operations within Rwanda during the height of the genocide in April and June were severely limited because of the insecure environment. Only the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the World Food Programme (WFP) operated in-country prior to the French-led Operation Turquoise, and the amount of food and medical support provided by those relief agencies was limited.[20] As such, these few remaining international actors did not require much coordination. In the end, it was the severely limited scale of early relief operations that led to widespread criticism of "too little too late."

Second, outside Rwanda, where a substantial number of humanitarian actors operated cross-border even during the height of the genocide, coordination proved difficult, largely because the Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General had limited authority to lead operations outside the country.[21] The lack of resources allocated to DHA also proved a problem. As a result, it was UNHCR and WFP, not DHA, that took responsibility for coordinating most of the humanitarian relief efforts outside Rwanda.[22] It was also reported that "Relief efforts in Rwanda suffered from interagency disputes among the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), UNHCR, various other UN agencies and NGOs [because of the] shortfalls in necessary resources."[23] Although DHA was established to solve precisely this sort of interagency turf battle, it was unable to build consensus among critical decision makers.

These criticisms notwithstanding, the international humanitarian response to the Rwandan crisis was one of the largest in the 1990s. Although few humanitarian relief efforts can meet the high standards of some critics – relief campaigns take place amid a complex web of unpredictable factors – one issue that became clear after Rwanda was that DHA had to transform itself into an organization with a specific niche within the world of UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations.

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[19] Miner et al., Op. cit., p.64.
[20] Borton, 1996, para. 9.1.
[21] Kehler, Op. cit., p. 22.
[22] Ibid., p. 22.
[23] Weil, 2001, p. 94.

(b) Cooperation between civilian and military actors

One key lesson that humanitarian actors learned in the Rwandan crisis in 1994 was the importance of cooperating with military forces. During the height of the genocide, the UNAMIR peacekeepers worked closely with the relief agencies that remained inside Rwanda.[24] Operation Turquoise, U.S.-led Operation Support Hope (OSH) and multiple military contingents from around the world, including Japan, secured areas and enabled humanitarian organizations to carry out their work. Military contingents typically provided logistical support and often delivered relief supplies themselves.[25] From the perspective of the military, Rwanda "underscored the importance of identifying and maintaining the comparative advantage of the military involvement in humanitarian relief."[26]

Humanitarian mandates given to the military contingents came as a unique opportunity for them, and incentivized military personnel to cooperate with civilian organizations. Although Operation Turquoise, carried out under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, was a peacekeeping mission, subsequent military contingents were assigned purely for humanitarian purposes; the first such mission was OSH. Troops from Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands and New Zealand subsequently joined the humanitarian relief efforts according to the packages negotiated between their governments and UNHCR.[27] The military contingents and UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies all contributed to the massive relief effort led by UNHCR.

(iv) Political climate in Japan prior to 1994

For Japanese policy makers, the Gulf War in 1990-1991 marked a turning point in the domestic political debate over Tokyo's involvement in international peacekeeping efforts. Although Japan contributed 11 billion dollars to support coalition operations to expel Iraq from Kuwait, Japan was not included in the list of nations subsequently acknowledged by Kuwait in the *Washington Post*.[28] This generated heated domestic debate over Japanese diplomacy, with some arguing that Japan should be more active in working toward collective security. Meanwhile, the UN

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[24] Mineav et al., Op. cit., Chap. 4.
[25] Ibid., Chap 4.
[26] Ibid., p. 151.
[27] Ibid., p. 14.
[28] The Japanese government contributed 1 billion dollars to the coalition on Aug. 30, 1990, 1 billion dollars on Sept. 14, 1990, and 9 billion dollars on Jan. 24, 1991. The full-page acknowledgement by the Kuwaiti government ran in the Washington Post on Mar. 11, 1991.

was contemplating sending a peacekeeping mission to Cambodia, and Japan felt it necessary to participate. As such, in 1992 the government passed the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL), making it possible to send SDF and civilian personnel overseas, as well as material, for the purposes of supporting UN peacekeeping missions, election monitoring and humanitarian relief activities. The same year, the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters was established within the Prime Minister's Office to implement peacekeeping operations under the IPCL.

In the two years between the IPCH's creation and the Rwandan crisis of summer 1994, the IPCH was involved in four non-humanitarian campaigns to which it extended both Japanese personnel and material support. While the only personnel it dispatched to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEMII) in 1992 and the UN Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) in 1994 were small contingents of election observers, those to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) starting in 1992 and to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) starting in 1993 included cease-fire observers, civilian police officers, engineers, staff officers, and so forth.[29] The IPCH also donated material to support elections under the UNTAC and the ONUMOZ. Once again, these four campaigns leading up to Rwanda were not humanitarian in nature.

As the Rwandan crisis unfolded, Japan was in the midst of a political transition. The Tomiichi Murayama coalition administration took the helm in June 1994, with Murayama becoming the nation's first prime minister from the Social Democratic Party. The coalition administration did not change the preceding governments' policy of striving to have Japan take on a larger role in international peacekeeping.[30] With the public still smarting from the sense that their country was a "faceless nation" in the international community, the Murayama administration was inclined to promote peacekeeping efforts to raise Japan's status.[31]

One development that reflected Japan's willingness to actively contribute to international peace-building through humanitarian activities was the launch of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993. TICAD I, a two-day conference sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), was held in

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[29] For UNTAC, 1,332 personnel – 16 cease-fire observers, two engineering units each with 600 people, 75 civilian police officers and 41 election personnel – were dispatched during the three missions between Sept. 1992 and June 1993. For ONUMOZ, 169 personnel – 10 staff officers, 144 movement control units and 15 election observers – were dispatched during the two missions between May 1993 and Nov. 1994. Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.

[30] "Japan premier: socialist's unarmed neutrality policy is outdated," 1994.

[31] Nakayama, 1994.

October 1993, drawing over one thousand people, largely high-ranking officials from African countries and representatives from multilateral governmental organizations and NGOs. TICAD I participants adopted the Tokyo Declaration of African Development, a statement that declared, among other things, the importance of providing assistance to conflict-affected people.[32] While some critics argued that TICAD was merely a diplomatic tool designed to raise Japan's stature in Africa, it nonetheless signified Tokyo's willingness to play a larger role in African peace-building.[33]

Policy discussions at the Ministry of Defense at that time were also focused on having Tokyo play a more proactive role in peacekeeping via humanitarian operations. In February 1994, MOD established a commission on security issues whereby policymakers and academics worked to develop outlines to replace the old security framework that was adopted in 1976. After the commission met for the 20th time, MOD submitted a paper entitled "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capacity of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century" to the Murayama administration on Aug. 12, 1994.[34] The report stressed the importance of Japan playing an active and constructive role in the changing international environment. It noted that humanitarian relief was one area where the SDF could step up its contributions under Japan's newly established IPCL.[35]

Thus, in summer 1994, the contexts surrounding the IPCH were: a malfunctioning UN-led peacekeeping regime; a laissez-faire relief regime; and the resultant massive ad-hoc humanitarian response to the Rwandan crisis. Combined with those international factors was a domestic political climate in Japan that favored giving humanitarian assistance to African countries. As the MOFA and MOD policy initiatives were being devised and implemented, the IPCH was called upon to join Japan's international humanitarian relief efforts. The time was ripe for the IPCH to try a new kind of relief response.

2. IPCH's response to the Rwandan crisis through in-kind donations

On July 15, 1994, four days prior to the establishment of the new Rwandan government, then UNHCR Commissioner Sadako Ogata held an emergency meeting with the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, which consisted of 24 donor

[32] TICAD, 1993, p. 4, (21).
[33] For criticism, see ODA-NET, 2005.
[34] Ministry of Defense, II, 1,(1).
[35] Tanaka, 1994, 3-shou, 1-setsu, 2.

governments and the European Commission.[36] At another such meeting on July 20, UNHCR officially presented these donor governments with a list of eight desired Service Packages. The contents included airlift services, site preparation for refugee camps, provision of potable water, and so forth.

By that time, Japan had already donated nine million dollars to humanitarian agencies such as UNHCR, the World Health Organization (WHO) and ICRC; an additional three million dollars had been given to UNAMIR. Tokyo had also provided grants to several Japanese humanitarian NGOs. Upon UNHCR's July 20 request and subsequent prompt responses by other donor governments, however, Japan found itself under pressure to make an additional contribution.

The IPCH was unofficially informed by MOFA of UNHCR's request on July 26. The relayed request was for a standard suite of prioritized relief items, such as tents and sleeping mats.[37] Partly because the needs for refugee relief operations were constantly changing, MOFA was unable to ascertain a priority list of relief items from UNHCR sooner. On Aug. 1, UNHCR officially requested that Japan donate relief items to UNHCR.[38]

From July 26, it took the IPCH 17 days to have UNHCR assistance approved at an Aug. 12 Cabinet meeting. At this point in its history, the IPCH lacked the operational capacity to directly meet UNHCR's request – it had neither stores of relief supplies nor working relationships with logistics firms that could deliver such goods. As such, the IPCH compared how long it would take various relief items to be delivered to Entebbe, Uganda, through market-based procurement and through an arrangement with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The IPCH determined that relief items would arrive most quickly if it worked with JICA.[39] The first planeload of JICA relief items landed in Entebbe, Uganda, on Aug. 15.[40]

These items arrived behind hastily arranged supplies from other donor countries. Several governments had delivered their first items as early as the end of July to the newly opened Goma Airport, whose fully functional runway allowed transport aircraft

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[36] Lange, 1996, p. 2.
[37] The proposed items of this in-kind donation were 6 sets of medicine, 43 large tents, 2,600 sleeping mats, 3,550 blankets, 213 water tanks and 1,000 shovels. Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.
[38] Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.
[39] Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.
[40] It cost the IPCH about 125 million yen to purchase relief items from JICA and 65 million yen to transport these items. Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.

to land around the clock thanks to the efforts of Operation Support Hope.[41] Australia was one of the fast-movers, with some 700,000 U.S. dollars worth of AusAID assistance taking off for Rwanda on July 28.[42] France, Germany, Canada and the U.S. completed their first wave of in-kind donations by Aug. 1.[43] Other major donors took about 10 days from UNHCR's official announcement of the Service Packages; the IPCH took 26 days.[44]

It should be noted that IPCH's slow response did not reflect an inability on the part of IPCH itself to promptly respond to UNHCR's request. In fact, by July 29, just a few days after the unofficial notification on July 26, the IPCH had scheduled all the meetings necessary to have the proposed in-kind operations authorized, including inter-ministerial meetings and a spot on the agenda for the Cabinet meeting to be held on Aug. 12.[45] And by the time other donor governments began moving, the IPCH had already crafted a thorough plan for its operational steps.

The reason for the slow 26-day response was that inter-ministerial meetings dragged on. The IPCH spent just six days deliberating before accepting the official Aug. 1 request from UNHCR, but twelve days were needed to complete a string of inter-ministerial meetings prior to the final Cabinet decision. Whether these inter-ministerial meetings could have proceeded more swiftly should be examined in comparison with other cases, an endeavor that is beyond the scope of this paper.

Regardless of the timeline, IPCH's work during the Rwandan crisis marked the first real application of the IPCL. And arguably, the extra two weeks that the IPCH took to get the operation in gear may be justified by its lack of experience and operational capacity at the time. Over the following several years, the IPCH worked diligently to address such issues, in part by establishing a stockpile system; the impact of these efforts could be seen during the Kosovo and East Timorese crises in 1999.

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41 Mcintyre, 1994.
42 "First Aussie Aid on the Way," 1994.
43 By Aug. 1, the First Africa Division of MOFA investigated the state of relief assistance carried out by major donor governments such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and the United States. Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.
44 The 26 days run from July 20, when UNHCR requested the eight service packages, to Aug. 15, when the relief items arrived at the Entebbe Airport.
45 Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009. Asahi Shinbun on July 29 also reported that the IPCH was considering providing in-kind relief to Rwandan refugees. See "Considering In-Kind Contribution Under the PKO Law for Rwandan Refugees," 1994.

III. Case Two: East Timor

1. Contextual analysis of the East Timorese crisis of 1999

(i) The international peacekeeping regime in the late 1990s and beyond

The short lull in UN-led peacekeeping in the late 1990s came to an abrupt end in 1999, when the UN found itself conducting peacekeeping and planning peace-building in Kosovo, then carrying out two peace-building missions in East Timor and Sierra Leone. In 2000, the landmark Brahimi Report – compiled by the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, a prominent Algerian diplomat – was released, advocating more robust and effective UN peacekeeping operations. This series of developments signaled the start of a new type of UN peacekeeping, commonly referred to as post-Brahimi or fourth-generation UN peacekeeping, and indicated the popularization of such concepts as peace-building and state-building.

The UN peace-building effort in East Timor – which began with the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 1999 and continues in the form of the current United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) – is often characterized as a comprehensive state-building approach, one led by multiple international actors. While the first two missions – the UNAMET and then International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), both in 1999 – had narrowly defined mandates (election monitoring and stabilization, respectfully), the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and subsequent missions were mandated with multiple state-building tasks. For instance, the UNTAET was charged with three broad responsibilities: humanitarian work, peacekeeping and governance/public administration.[46]

In a sense, the East Timor experience offered a model for "quick-and-dirty" but "successful" UN-led state-building operations; UN agencies, international financial institutions and donor governments took this approach during a string of subsequent missions where they continued to painfully learn by trial and error how to engage local actors.[47] The UN and the World Bank played a central role in building up East Timor from the vacuum of 1999, wherein administrative capacity was nonexistent and infrastructure in rubble. Ten years on, although East Timor still faces challenges such as a weak civilian police force and a feeble judiciary system, it does have a working physical infrastructure, as well as standing political institutions through which the

[46] Howard, 2008, Chap. 8.
[47] Paris, 2004, p. 221; Howard, Op. cit., p. 297.

locals are governing, policing, making laws and so forth.[48]

(ii) The international humanitarian regime in the late 1990s and beyond

(a) Cooperation among humanitarian actors: Establishment of OCHA

With DHA facing increasing accusations of incompetency, in 1997 the UNGA attempted another reform by replacing it with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA's role was limited to the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and advocacy; it was not endowed with operational capacity. For example, two such DHA functions were reassigned to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Furthermore, OCHA's staff was substantially smaller than DHA's.[49]

OCHA was saddled with low expectations from the start. Some argued that the reform was cosmetic and had "limited leverage" as far as prodding stakeholders toward better coordination.[50] Indeed, the reform was somewhat of a compromise between UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, and InterAction, the consortium of American NGOs. Interagency bickering continued.[51] And the Emergency Relief Coordinator, head of the OCHA, held the same position as its predecessor in the UN hierarchy: Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, ranking below the heads of UN humanitarian agencies.[52] The Consolidated Appeals Process remained a "shopping list of the past," unable to prioritize requested relief items.[53] It was argued that OCHA merely reinforced "laissez-faire humanitarianism," and that its relief work remained a form of "creative chaos."[54]

On the advocacy front, OCHA also had limited sway. On paper, it was charged with "ensuring the protection of civilians in armed conflict and respect for international humanitarian law," and expected to raise the issue of civilian protection with UN

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[48] Howard, Op. cit., p. 298.
[49] The de-mining function was transferred to the DPKO and conflict prevention and preparedness to UNDP. See Weiss, 1998, pp. 60-61.
[50] Ibid., p. 61.
[51] The original proposal, to have UNHCR assume a more visible role in humanitarian response in complex emergencies, was overturned by the heads of UNICEF, the WFP and InterAction. See Ibid., p. 53.
[52] Weiss called the head of DHA an "inferior rank" to "the executive heads of UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF as well as UNDP." Ibid., p. 56. Although the head of OCHA remained as the Under Secretary-General on paper, Weiss predicted that Sergio Vieira de Mello, the first Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under Secretary-General, would perhaps be able to raise OCHA's status. See Ibid., p. 65.
[53] Ibid., p. 62. See also Longford, 1999.
[54] Weiss, Op. cit., pp. 59, 64.

member states, particularly those on the Security Council.[55] Some observers note the importance of political advocacy as a preventative force, saying that when it comes to humanitarian response, responsibilities "lie with the political action of the states to stop a war or modify the behavior of belligerents."[56] Yet in 1998, OCHA was criticized of having "limited leverage" to influence Security Council decisions.[57]

Eight years later, during the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in summer 2006, the violation of protection by combatants was painfully visible, with civilians deliberately targeted by both sides.[58] The UN Human Rights Commissioner and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (the head of OCHA) condemned the indiscriminative attacks and then Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the immediate cessation of violence, but major powers such as the U.S. and the U.K. declined to do the same.[59] It may be unrealistic to expect OCHA to have leverage over major powers in advocating civilian protection, but given the lofty aspirations of OCHA's mission statement, its inability to sway other parties in 2006 served to reinforce the notion that the UN may talk a good game, but is weak in implementation.[60]

Criticism also arose on the policy development front. The Interagency Standing Committee (IASC), a forum for collaborative policy development, was seen to be "foot-dragging" in 1998.[61] To this day, the IASC is struggling to garner support from non-UN humanitarian agencies. It seems that the IASC has failed to increase its leverage over non-UN humanitarian actors; for instance, critical players such as Médecins Sans Frontières and ICRC have withdrawn from its "Cluster Approach" scheme, introduced in 2005 as the latest policy tool aimed at bolstering international humanitarian response.

(b) Cooperation with non-humanitarian actors: Relief-development gap discourse and beyond

Throughout the 1990s, humanitarian actors discussed the problems of local

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[55] See OCHA's mandate, GA Resolution 46/182 (1991) and the Secretary-General's Reform 1997.
[56] Shearer et al., 2007. p. 339
[57] Weiss, Op. cit., p. 61.
[58] See Shearer et al., Op. cit., p. 339
[59] Ibid., p. 343.
[60] Shearer writes "[t]he Secretary-General's High-level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence acknowledges that the main problem lies with the member states' failure to put their words into action…[t]he Panel went on to say that '[w]e remain deeply concerned, however, that the global implementation of human rights lags far behind its articulation" (UN, 2006a, p.26.) Ibid., p. 341.
[61] Weiss, Op. cit., p. 60.

people rebuilding their lives after humanitarian campaigns. An increasing number of former refugees and IDPs were finding it difficult to reintegrate into society, or achieve basic human security against the backdrop of a weak state. UNHCR in particular worked to develop ways to assist refugees and IDPs after core relief campaigns. Against this backdrop, it developed policies offering a more comprehensive approach. For example, in the late 1990s UNHCR added an infrastructure component to its portfolio of quick impact projects – now called community empowerment programs – in a bid to expand beyond its conventional activities of repatriation assistance and the short-term distribution of relief supplies.[62]

Development actors echoed those humanitarian actors' call for a more comprehensive approach to assist refugees and IDPs, but they did this from their own development-oriented perspectives. In particular, the smooth reintegration of repatriates into post-conflict societies emerged as a critical topic in the development discourse. For example, the World Bank in 1997 created the Post-Conflict Unit within the Social Development Department as well as established the Post-Conflict Fund, moves taken to "enhance its ability to support countries in transition from conflict to sustainable peace and economic growth."[63] Placing this issue within the social development context sprang from the premise that the establishment of a just societal framework is essential for post-conflict nations to free themselves from the vicious poverty-conflict circle. In 1999, UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery was reorganized so that it could play a more assertive role in building up social fabrics to facilitate development. By 2000, observers were noting that "pursuit of both relief and development has become a dominant paradigm among international aid agencies."[64]

The momentum for international aid actors to fill the gap between the relief and the development phases peaked during the Brookings Process in 1999, which was launched thanks to the commitment of top policy makers, including Ogata and Wolfenson. During the process, these two leaders hosted roundtable discussions with other top officials at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. Their efforts resulted in the gap agenda being acknowledged as an important issue by the United Nations Economic and Social Council.[65] Subsequently, many other relief and development assistance institutions began to tweak their program frameworks to address gap-filling.

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[62] Suhrke et al., 2005. p. 6.
[63] World Bank, 1999.
[64] White et al., 2000, p. 314.
[65] Takasu, Op. cit., p. 58.

The gap-filling momentum lost steam, however, after the Brookings Process stalled upon Ogata's departure from UNHCR in 2001. Even before the start of the process, some argued that the segregation of aid operations into distinct relief and development components was too simplistic and overlooked contextual analysis.[66] As the idea of linking relief and development grew in popularity, critics warned of the danger of expanding the respective scopes of relief and development organizations, arguing that this would result in "mission creep" for the World Bank and the compromising of the humanitarian principles of relief actors.[67] Furthermore, UN bureaucrats tended to see the issue as one that could be addressed with better intra-sector coordination, rather than one that would require a wholesale overhaul of the aid framework.[68] Against this backdrop, Sierra Leone and Burundi were selected as countries in which to try out gap-filling measures, but these pilot projects were not implemented due to deteriorating security in the two countries.[69]

The relief-development discourse lost even further steam in the early 2000s. With increased attention to state-building in post-conflict societies, the relief-development problem began to be seen as increasingly irrelevant to the international aid community. The relief-development gap for post-conflict societies began to be categorized into several different topic areas such as rehabilitation, conflict prevention and reconstruction. For example, in 2002 the World Bank's Post-Conflict Unit was replaced by Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction units to firmly differentiate their respective roles.[70] The same year, the World Bank launched a task force called Low Income Countries Under Stress and began to address poverty from the angle of weak institutions and poor governance.[71] UNDP followed suit in 2003, launching its Justice and Security Sector Reform Program to help societies become less conflict-prone.[72] As the discussions over conflict prevention, reconstruction and institution building in post-conflict societies gathered momentum, the relief-development problem became less pertinent to the international aid community.

(c) Implications of better cooperation: Political humanitarianism

Prior to the end of the Cold War, humanitarianism was applied apolitically within the context of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. It was argued that the leading

66 White et al., Op. cit.
67 On the World Bank, see Einhorn, 2001; Fidler, 2001.
68 Takasu, Op. cit., p. 57.
69 Ibid., p. 60.
70 Suhrke et al., Op. cit., p. 7.
71 See World Bank, 2002.
72 Suhrke et al., Op. cit., p. 9.

humanitarian UN agencies were occupying merely "a supernumerary position to the consideration of the power balance."[73] On one hand, UN humanitarian agencies would typically play distinct roles in providing various types of assistance: UNHCR provided repatriation assistance to refugees; WFP extended emergency rations to areas affected by natural disasters; UNICEF gave assistance to children and their mothers. Since their programs were coordinated by a single national government, their activities did not overlap. On the other hand, non-UN humanitarian organizations, notably those supporting Red Cross/Crescent, operated discreetly, because nondisclosure was critical to gaining access to and protection in war zones. Adhering to their core principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence enabled humanitarian actors to gain access to the people they wanted to help.

After the Cold War, however, an increasing number of various types of humanitarian actors began working in close proximity to each other as intrastate conflicts and complex emergencies came into sharper focus on the world stage. Humanitarian actors found themselves working with human rights actors, development players and military contingents in post-conflict zones. This side-by-side existence was the function of the political vacuums in post-conflict countries, particularly those that had been wrecked by internal strife. Unlike responses to natural disasters, where sovereign states typically took responsibility for providing relief and protection to their own citizens, complex emergencies led international humanitarian actors to take responsibility for providing security for refugees and IDPs. Against this backdrop, previously distinct operations like stabilization, humanitarian relief, reconstruction and development began to come under a single umbrella.

Humanitarian/development players and non-humanitarian actors were cooperating not only out of necessity, but also because their objectives were converging under the concept of human rights protection. The former group began to acknowledge the importance of political advocacy, while UN member states began to think of the use of force as a necessary evil to safeguard human rights.

As humanitarian actors witnessed more human rights violations and mass civilian killings in the field, they began to have doubts over their century-old principle of discretion. The Bosnian and Rwandan genocides in particular had this effect. In the Rwandan case, MSF, Oxfam and a number of other humanitarian agencies vigorously campaigned for international military intervention.[74] For instance, Philippe Gaillard of the ICRC, one of the few foreign humanitarian workers in Rwanda

[73] Munro, 1999, para. 4.
[74] Foley, Op. cit., p. 62.

during the genocide, expressed his responsibility to speak up even if it would run counter to neutrality.[75] Meanwhile, the insufficient mandates and resources of UN peacekeepers in the first half of the 1990s led Secretary-General Annan to review the UN peacekeeping protocol. He wanted to avoid a repeat of what happened in Bosnia and Rwanda, wherein UN peacekeepers witnessed massacres. In this way, humanitarian/development players and non-humanitarian actors, two camps with different core principles, were converging under the umbrella of human rights protection.

While the Rwandan experience opened the door for the active engagement of military contingents in complex relief campaigns, it also raised concerns among humanitarian actors that cooperation may compromise the apolitical nature of humanitarian activities. In the Rwandan case, this concern materialized in the form of the deployment of the Operation Turquoise being labeled as a "partisan attempt" to support its Hutu "allies."[76] In fact, highly politicized Operation Turquoise "permitted many of those directly involved in the genocide to flee to neighboring Zaire."[77] UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies set up refugee camps in Zaire, and were harshly criticized for "feeding killers" there.[78] A striking example of humanitarian aid not only being partisan, but also exacerbating a conflict, took place in Somalia in the early 1990s, with the distribution of food aid stoking sectarian violence.[79] When local populations perceive foreign aid as being biased, relief personnel are at increased risk of being targeted. This problem of diminished humanitarian space continues today.[80]

(iii) International humanitarian response to the East Timorese crisis

Indonesia was going through a historical moment in 1998-89. Popular discontent with the authoritarian Suharto regime (1967-98) led him to step down and Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie to be sworn in as President in 1998. Habibie and his cabinet decided to let East Timor hold a referendum on independence or autonomy on Aug. 30, 1999. Soon after 78.5% of East Timorese voters expressed their desire for independence, the international community was taken by surprise when anti-independence militias turned to violence in and around the capital city of Dili.[81]

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[75] Gaillard, 2004, excerpt 2, "In the Face of Evil."
[76] Foley, 2008, p. 62.
[77] Ibid., p. 62.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Easterly, 2006, pp. 144-45.
[80] Donini argues "there is no humanitarian consensus in Afghanistan and very little humanitarian space." Donini, 2009, p. 2.
[81] Howard, 2006, p. 266. Downer reports, however, that numerous warnings concerning

Over two-week period, the militia burned and looted, and killed unarmed civilians.[82] The violence spread to Indonesian West Timor, where many had fled to from East Timor. Personnel of the UNAMET and of UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies also came under attack. As the violence escalated, all UN staff in all of East Timor except for essential personnel in the UNAMET headquarters in Dili evacuated on Sept. 10.[83] Most foreigners working for non-UN humanitarian organizations in East Timor also evacuated out of fear for their lives.[84] The militia controlled access to the IDPs in East Timor, and fear of starvation grew in the international community. It was estimated that 190,000 IDPs were in dire straits by mid-September.[85]

This post-referendum violence unfolded as the UN was about to change the way it looked at peacekeeping, and as the newly established OCHA was still struggling to garner support from UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies. The relief-development gap discourse was still a hot topic in the international aid community, and concerns over political humanitarianism were looming.

The UN launched a concerted effort to address the crisis, using diplomacy and then intervention. A negotiating team dispatched by the UN Security Council met with Indonesian officials from Sept. 8-12, with the UN envoys requesting Jakarta's permission for relief organizations to resume their operations in East Timor. In the meantime, UN humanitarian agencies began preparing for a large-scale operation.[86] Jakarta gave the green light, and on Sept. 17 the WFP began airlifting food to East Timor and local and international humanitarian organizations resumed delivering food and shelter equipment to the refugees in West Timor.[87] Donor governments supported these efforts primarily by offering funds to UN humanitarian agencies, including UNHCR and the WFP.

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) under the Australian-led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) was largely successful.[88] Similar to the role played by the U.S. military during OSH in Rwanda, during the early stages of relief INTERFET limited its aid activities to airlifting and escorting humanitarian actors to their operation sites. INTERFET also played a central role in repatriating refugees.

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the possible post-referendum violence were issued and that "Australia and other interested parties registered their concerns with Indonesia." See Downer, 2000, p. 7.

[82] UNHCR, 1999.
[83] WFP, 1999.
[84] UNHCR, Op. cit.
[85] USAID, 1999.
[86] UN Security Council, 1999.
[87] USAID, 1999.
[88] Elmquist, 1999, "Conclusion-Lessons Learned."

For example, in advance of an expected surge of refugees and IDPs into Dili, INTERFET and UNHCR developed a plan to handle the situation; INTERFET went on to provide protection at entry points and way stations. Although this CIMIC success was largely due to favorable conditions – "relatively simple political and geographical backdrop, the limited number of key players, and imperative need to make civilian-military relations to work" – the close collaboration was also the result of specific policies designed to ensure a smooth experience.[89] For example, throughout INTERFET's mission, CIMIC officers of INTERFET and OCHA's CIMIC team met daily. These gatherings, which were held at CIMIC-specific installations such as Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOC), played a key role in disseminating information.[90] As such, CIMIC under INTERFET was called "one of the most successful examples of the military and humanitarians working in unison to achieve common objectives in a complex emergency situation."[91]

International in-kind contributions during INTERFET were provided for displaced East Timorese in three phases, all of which were adroitly orchestrated by UN humanitarian agencies.[92] Prior to INTERFET securing airfields, the WFP airdropped rations and other supplies. During this first phase, the WFP supervised the delivery of relief supplies from its joint warehouse with UNHCR in Darwin, Australia. The second phase, the delivery of relief supplies via helicopter, came once INTERFET peacekeepers secured landing zones. INTERFET continued to provide helicopter logistical support for a month or so, until WFP had securely established its own airlift capabilities.[93] In the third phase, an increasing number of areas were declared safe by INTERFET, and UN and non-UN humanitarian actors began delivering supplies by land. This wave of supplies included items intended to meet the longer-term needs of refugees and IDPs. This third phase continued during the UNTAET. In short, the UN played a central role in orchestrating a large-scale humanitarian relief campaign in East Timor in 1999.

Among the in-kind donors, OFDA/USAID acted particularly swiftly, with those supplies reaching Darwin as early as Sept. 22.[94] Other donors, including the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) and the British Department for International

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89 On the favorable conditions, see Ibid., "Conclusion-Lessons Learned."
90 Ibid., "Early CIMIC Arrangement."
91 Ibid., "Conclusion-Lessons Learned."
92 USIS Washington File, 1999.
93 Elmquist, Op. cit., "Working Relations in the Airports."
94 USIS Washington File, Op. cit.

Development (DFID), on Sept. 23 provided materials to support INTERFET.[95] As for Japan, while it was unable to dispatch personnel because of IPCL constraints, it did establish the UN Trust Fund for INTERFET, endowing it with 100 million dollars.[96]

(iv) Political climate in Japan in 1999

In 1999, the policy discussions on Japanese support for peace-building largely resembled those of 1994. Policymakers continued to search for ways to raise Japan's presence in the global community via international cooperation. Unlike the conflict in Rwanda, however, the one in East Timor complicated the debate, as Japan had long taken a pro-Jakarta line, just as several other major donors had. As such, when the violence escalated in East Timor, Tokyo responded diplomatically, keeping its stance closely aligned with that of the international community in the hope of avoiding upsetting its political and economic relationship with Indonesia, but also of restoring regional security. Tokyo's approach was a skillful two-track one, in which it sought to stand with international financial institutions and maintain its economic relationship with Jakarta, as well as to support the UN-led effort to restore peace in East Timor.

As a series of events unfolded in Indonesia prior to the August referendum, Japan continued its decades-long silence over Jakarta's policy on East Timor. During the authoritarian Suharto regime, Tokyo implicitly condoned Jakarta's security approach to East Timor, although these policies raised human rights concerns among some Western donors, particularly the Netherlands.[97] Japan, along with the U.S., Britain, and Australia, voted against or abstained from eight UNGA resolutions condemning Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor. However, after Habibie and his cabinet decided to let East Timor hold a referendum, Tokyo officially welcomed Jakarta's decision and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution.[98] As the UN, Portugal and Indonesia discussed details of the upcoming referendum, Japan announced its readiness to assist their trilateral effort.[99] Tokyo contributed 10.1 million dollars to the UN to support the referendum, and the IPCH dispatched six civilian personnel to the UNAMET. With these steps, Japan showed the international community that it supported the UN initiative to restore regional stability.

However, Tokyo never explicitly attempted to use its economic leverage as

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[95] SRSA and DFID on Sept. 23 provided packages containing temporary housing materials, office equipment and communications devices to support the staff engaged in relief activities in Dili. See Elmquist, Op.cit., "Background."
[96] Gorjão, 2002, p. 765.
[97] Ibid., p. 758.
[98] MOFA, 28 Jan. 1999.
[99] MOFA, 27 April 1999.

Indonesia's largest ODA donor to pressure Jakarta to take specific actions.[100] Even at the height of the violence and after the international community decided on Sept. 10 to intervene, Japanese officials were not considering changing their ODA policy toward Indonesia; rather, they merely encouraged Jakarta to bring the situation under control.[101] Tokyo waited for the international community to intervene militarily and increased its response.[102] In the end, Japan's primary modus operandi was again the classic one of "checkbook diplomacy," this time in the form of donations to the UN Trust Fund for INTERFET.[103]

MOFA's policy stance toward Southeast Asia in 1999 reflected this two-track approach of separately pursuing economic stability and regional security. Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, Japan scrambled to help shell-shocked neighbors recover. Under the Miyazawa Initiative, Japan pledged to give Indonesia 2.4 billion yen in ODA loans and commodities grants by March 1999 in partnership with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.[104] This package did not only target economic recovery, but also state-building. The package included 31 million dollars in grants to support a general Indonesian election to be held under the Habibie administration.[105]

As for restoring political stability, Japan pledged to support the UN's peace-building mission with robust funding. When the UNAMET was established on June 11, Tokyo announced a package of money, personnel, and materials.[106] This support for political resolution in East Timor, however, was designed to be as apolitical as possible. For example, on March 16, then MOFA Press Secretary Sadaaki Numata

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[100] However, Gorjão does note that "on September 8, Japanese Ambassador to Indonesia Takeo Kawakami met Habibie and told him that 'the current situation [was] not in the interests of Indonesia' and therefore Jakarta should 'fulfill its responsibility in maintaining security and safety of east Timor.'" Gorjão, 2002, pp. 762-63.

[101] "Japan not planning to stop aid to Indonesia." 1999; see also Gorjão, Op cit., p. 763.

[102] During the meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) members in New Zealand on Sept. 9-10, the international community reached a consensus to intervene. However, it was not until Sept. 12, during the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral summit – at which a joint statement expressing grave concern over East Timor and an intention to work closely with the UN and the international community was adopted– that Tokyo expressed its support for intervention: "[I]f the Indonesian government cannot fulfill its responsibility of restoring safety and order, we should ask Indonesia to promptly accept the support of the international community and restore safety and order." MOFA, 12 Sept. 1999, II.

[103] Gorjão, Op. cit., p.764.

[104] MOFA, 16 March 1999.

[105] Ibid.

[106] It was announced that Japan had already decided on the dispatch of a political affairs office, a 10.11 million dollar contribution for the U.N. Trust Fund, and assistance in kind of 2,000 radio sets. MOFA, 29 June 1999.

said that "Indonesia [had] been effectively ruling East Timor." Numata reiterated Japan's hands-off stance, saying, "the question of where East Timor belongs [is] a matter to be decided on through the mediation efforts by UN Secretary General Annan between the parties concerned, namely Indonesia and Portugal."[107] At a Japan-ASEAN ministerial meeting on July 27, when the referendum was only a month away, then MOFA Minister Masahiko Koumura avoided commenting on East Timor, rather just saying that Asia had to "overcome the lingering influence of the currency and economic crisis."[108] In such ways, Japan treated Southeast Asian economic recovery and regional security as separate matters.[109]

2. IPCH's response to the East Timorese crisis through in-kind donations

On Sept. 13, a meeting was held at the UN office in Jakarta. At this meeting, top officials of UNHCR and UNDP briefed participants – including personnel of NGO and of the embassies of potential donor governments – on the dire straits of IDPs in East Timor, and requested that the meeting participants lend their support.[110] On Sept. 16, a staffer of UNHCR's Tokyo office visited the International Peace Cooperation Division at MOFA's Foreign Policy Bureau (IPCD/MOFA), inquiring whether the IPCH could donate all available relief items in the Humanitarian Relief Stockpile Supply (HRSS).[111]

The HRSS was built up in the wake of Japanese relief supplies arriving rather slowly to UNHCR's field offices during the Rwandan crisis, a bitter experience that sparked discussion at the IPCH's in-kind unit as to how such operations could be expedited. Various ideas were considered, including exempting donations from required Cabinet approval. In the end, the IPCH decided to stockpile relief items in warehouses. As such, the HRSS was established in 1997. The HRSS currently stockpiles enough tents, jerry cans, and so on for 30,000 people.

On Sept. 17, 1999, the day after the UNHCR unofficially asked IPCD/MOFA to support its East Timorese operations, the IPCH began deliberations on how to provide the requested relief supplies. Among the items considered were basic supplies from the HRSS, shelter materials owned by Hyogo Prefecture, food from an NGO, and

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[107] MOFA, 16 March 1999.
[108] MOFA, 27 July 1999.
[109] As for the MOD's stance on East Timor, I was unable to find much record of such discussions in 1999 at the ministry.
[110] Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.
[111] Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.

non-food items from JICA stockpiles.[112] The IPCH and IPCD/MOFA worked together at this time, and by Sept. 24, IPCD/MOFA had hammered out a plan to contribute money and supplies upon the issuance of OCHA's consolidated appeal, which was to come within 10 days.[113] After the final decision was made that the IPCH would contribute relief items from the HRSS, UNHCR on Oct. 11 sent an official letter to the Permanent Mission of Japan at the UN office in Geneva, requesting that Japan contribute the relief supplies.[114] By then, 27 days had passed since MOFA was informed of the meeting at the UN office in Jakarta.

On Oct. 22, the Cabinet approved the donations of proposed relief items to UNHCR; this quick 11-day turnaround from the UNHCR's Oct. 11 letter was thanks to things being planned out well, including the necessary inter-ministerial meetings scheduled prior to the UNHCR's official request.

However, starting the count from the meeting on Sept. 13 in Jakarta, the IPCH's relief items took 39 days to arrive at Darwin.[115] In embarrassing contrast, OFDA/USAID supplies arrived in Darwin on Sept. 22, and SRSA/DFID shelter materials for INTERFET's Civil Military Operation Centers (CMOC) arrived in Dili on Sept. 23.[116]

One reason the IPCH took so long was that the information supplied by the UN's Jakarta office was insufficient for the IPCH to swiftly complete its administrative processes. As late as Sept. 30, the IPCH and IPCD/MOFA were struggling to answer questions such as: How would the request for in-kind contributions fit into the overall Japanese effort to support IDPs and refugees in East and West Timor? How many supplies would the UN need over the course of the campaign? What was UNHCR's plan to transport the requested items?[117] There were also communication issues between UNHCR, OCHA and the Japanese government. For instance, the IPCH and IPCD/MOFA were concerned that the tents requested by UNHCR were not included in the consolidated appeals process issued by OCHA, and they raised this trivial issue at inter-Ministerial meetings.[118] It was not until Oct. 8 that the IPCH and ministries cleared all the necessary administrative steps and officially requested MOFA to have

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[112] Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.
[113] Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.
[114] In this letter a UNHCR official asked the Japanese government for 500 tents, 9,000 blankets, 11,140 sleeping mats, 20,000 water containers and 5,120 plastic tarps.
[115] The Japanese relief items arrived in Darwin on Oct. 23, 25 and 27.
[116] The relief items provided by OFDA/USAID included such things as: 500 plastic tarps, 20,000 blankets and 5,200 water containers.
[117] Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.
[118] Interview with an IPCH staff member, IPCH office in Tokyo, 1 Sept. 2009.

UNHCR ask the Japanese government for the proposed relief items.

Japan's financial contribution to the East Timorese campaign was substantial and prompt. Prior to the violence, Japan had provided the UNAMET with a 10 million dollar trust fund, 2,000 radios, and six officials. On Sept. 16 – within two weeks of the escalation of violence – Japan pledged a total of two million dollars to UNHCR and WFP to assist their emergency operations.[119] It also established the UN Trust Fund for INTERFET with 100 million dollars, helping Southeast Asian nations participate in a coalition of the willing.[120] However, when it came to achieving the IPCL's goal of extending "aid visibly tied to Japan," the IPCH by and large failed to deliver.

Furthermore, the establishment of the HRSS failed to speed up the IPCH's response time in East Timor, as had been sought after the sluggishness of Japan's response to the Rwandan crisis. However, the stockpile system did help the IPCH deliver a large amount of supplies. The amount of relief items donated by Japan during both the Kosovo and East Timorese crises were substantially higher than in the Rwandan one.[121] And as far as delivery speed goes, the East Timorese case did teach the IPCH that better information management is critical.

Conclusion

This paper looked at the IPCH's humanitarian in-kind contribution operations in Rwanda and East Timor, examining them against the backdrop of the concurrent international and domestic contexts. During the Rwandan crisis, the IPCH benefitted from the eagerness of policymakers to boost Japan's global presence through international humanitarian relief. Though the concurrent peacekeeping and humanitarian regimes were not conducive toward the IPCH easily carrying out humanitarian operations, the IPCH nonetheless took the important first step of extending assistance. Notwithstanding the feebleness of UN peacekeeping and the problem of the DHA lacking a strong mandate, the IPCH was able to deliver its first-ever batch of relief supplies, albeit two weeks slower than other major donors. The IPCH also dispatched some 400 SDF personnel to assist refugees and IDPs, a move that remains one of the IPCH's greatest achievements. The establishment of the

[119] MOFA, 16 Sept. 1999.

[120] Since INTERFET did not receive funding from the UN peacekeeping budget, nations contributing troops were expected to pay for their own way. As such, Japan's Trust Fund "might have convinced some Southeast Asian countries to participate in the 'coalition of the willing.'" Gorjão, Op cit., p. 765.

[121] During the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the IPCH provided 1,000 tents, 10,000 blankets and 5,000 sleeping mats.

HRSS also reflected the IPCH's dedication to improving its performance.

During the East Timorese crisis, however, the IPCH suffered from Japan's political ambivalence over the East Timor–Indonesia question. On one hand, Tokyo had a vested interest in the Indonesian economy recovering, and had typically been noncommittal on Southeast Asian security issues. On the other hand, Tokyo was still searching for ways to contribute to international peace-building. The fact that the IPCH and IPCD/MOFA insisted on receiving such detailed information from the UN before extending supplies was likely a function of the Japanese political climate, which was less hospitable to overseas adventures than in 1994. Despite the newly established HRSS, the IPCH took two weeks longer to deliver supplies than it did during the Rwandan crisis. While the international peacekeeping regime was more favorable to humanitarian intervention in 1999 than in 1994, this did not have much bearing on the IPCH, as it remained constrained by the IPCL. Meanwhile, OCHA was still dealing with its lack of leverage over better-funded core UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations, a dynamic that negatively impacted the IPCH in the form of OCHA and UNHCR supplying conflicting information.

Although further studies could help give a more complete picture of how well the IPCH has performed with its humanitarian-oriented in-kind contributions, the above examination of the Rwandan and the East Timorese responses suggests several policy prescriptions.

When it comes to improving the response time to UN and non-UN requests for in-kind contributions, the key may be to improve information management during the period leading up to the UN submitting its wish list to the Japanese government on behalf of the IPCH. During the Rwandan crisis the IPCH took just six days to schedule and prepare for each inter-ministerial meeting, but during the East Timorese crisis it took 24 days. The slowdown came as the UNHCR and OCHA failed to provide accurate, consistent and prompt information as the IPCH and IPCD/MOFA had requested – and as these offices required to execute their internal administrative processes. The IPCH could have averted such a waste of time had it been better prepared for the foibles of the UN-led international relief regime – having a firm understanding of one's environment and fellow actors is essential. Lastly, while the HRSS emerged during the East Timorese crisis as a valuable tool for the IPCH, it is important to note that this stockpile system served to increase the volume of supplies, but not the speed at which they were delivered.

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